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Of Coase, Calabresi, and Optimal
Tax Liability
KYLE D. LOGUE* AND JOEL SLEMROD**
I.

INTRODUCTION

In his 1960 paper The Problem of Social Cost, Ronald Coase fa
mously observed that, in a world with zero transactions costs, negotia
tion among interested parties can overcome the inefficiencies
otherwise caused by externalities.1 This is sometimes referred to as
Coase's "efficiency proposition."2 Coase further argued that, in this
frictionless world, the assignment of legal entitlements or obligations
would not affect the ultimate allocation of resources, and therefore
the efficiency of this allocation.3 This is sometimes known as Coase's
"invariance proposition. "4
These two propositions collectively make up the so-called Coase
Theorem.5 Thus, for example, in the absence of transaction costs, it is
irrelevant whether we give a manufacturer the "right to pollute" or we
give the adjoining property owner the "right to be free of pollution. "6
Either way, the parties will agree to the same (efficient) amount of
pollution. Coase also noted that the assignment of legal entitlements
can have distributional consequences, despite the absence of transac
tion costs. Thus, although it makes no difference in terms of efficiency
whether the polluter or the pollutee has the relevant legal entitlement,
again assuming zero transaction costs, the assignment of the legal enti
tlement can make a big difference to the parties involved and can dra*
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matically affect their relative wealth. We refer to this observation as
the Coasean "distributional variance proposition."
Although Coase's original paper focused on a hypothetical world in
which transaction costs were totally absent, Coase was well aware that
in all real-world settings transaction costs are present and, in many
settings, are high.7 For this reason, the Coase Theorem is perhaps
most influential for what it says about a world with transaction costs:
That in such a world the assignment of legal entitlements (or the
choice of legal rules) can affect overall efficiency.8 Indeed, this re
statement of Coase's basic point can reasonably be understood as the
conceptual foundation of the entire law and economics movement,
which has risen to prominence within the U.S. legal academy over the
past several decades. Most law and economics scholarship in the
fields of torts, property, and contract law can be seen as attempting to
assess whether existing legal rules are efficient or to ascertain the most
efficient legal rule for a given situation, given the existence of transac
tion costs.
One famous example of this sort of scholarship would be the work
of Guido Calabresi in tort law. In his seminal book, The Cost ofAcci
dents: A Legal and Economic Analysis, Calabresi concluded that, as
suming transaction costs prevent a Coasean result, the optimal tort
liability regime is one that minimizes the sum of the cost of accidents
and the cost of avoiding accidents, including the administrative costs
of the tort system.9 Calabresi concluded that such a regime will some
times call for assigning tort liability to the "cheapest cost avoider"
that is, to the party able to minimize negative externalities (or third
party harms) most efficiently.10 We refer to this party as the cheapest
cost or least-cost harm avoider.11
Unbeknownst to most lawyers, but well known to economists, there
is a theorem within the economic analysis of taxation that is, on its
face, strikingly similar to the Coase Theorem. This notion, dubbed the
"theorem of the invariance of tax incidence" has been present in the
public finance literature for decades.12 Although this theorem is
rarely stated formally, the informal version goes something like this:
7 Ronald H. Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law 174 (1988) ("The world of zero
transaction costs has often been described as a Coasian world. Nothing could be further
from the truth.").
B See A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 15 (3d ed. 2003).
9 Guido Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis 31 (1970).
10 Id. at 135.
11 See id.
12 This term was coined by Pierre Picard & Eric Toulemonde, On the Equivalence of
Taxes Paid by Employers and Employees, 48 Scottish J. Pol. Econ. 461, 464 (2001) (citing
Hugh Dalton, Principles of Public Finance 38 (1954), who wrote: "It makes no essential
difference whether the tax is legally imposed on buyers or sellers.").
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The incidence of a tax imposed on the sale or purchase of a good or
service will be independent of the assignment of the legal obligation to
remit the tax to the government.13 That is to say, it does not matter if
the obligation to remit the tax is imposed on the seller or the pur
chaser of a good or service: The result will be the same. By "obliga
tion to remit" we mean the obligation imposed by law on a private
party to transfer funds in satisfaction of a particular legal liability. (As
we discuss more fully below, a precise statement of the Coase Theo
rem also requires the use of the concept of remittance. )14 As with the
Coase Theorem, the tax remittance invariance conclusion depends on
a number of assumptions, although in the tax remittance case the as
sumptions have largely been implicit. Because this version of the tax
remittance invariance idea is about incidence, we refer to it as the
"Tax Remittance Invariance Proposition-Incidence" (TRIPI) .
The reasoning underlying the tax remittance idea also implies a par
allel efficiency (or inefficiency) proposition. That is, under standard
competitive-market assumptions, the allocation of resources-and
therefore the welfare costs of a tax-do not depend on who (as be
tween the two parties to the transaction) is required to remit the tax to
the government. We call this the "Tax Remittance Invariance Pro
position-Efficiency (TRIPE)."
In contrast to the vast literature expanding on the Coase Theo
rem-exploring its implications for various areas of private law (in
cluding torts) and investigating its underlying assumptions15-little
scholarly attention has been directed at understanding the key as
sumptions underlying the tax law invariance ideas.16 What is even
more puzzling is that, despite the general acceptance of the tax remit
tance invariance propositions within the public finance literature and
the canonical status of the Coase Theorem within the law and eco
nomics literature, the obvious parallels, and somewhat less obvious
differences, between Coase and the TRIPs have gone completely
unanalyzed. In this Article, using examples from tort law as our pri
mary analytical lens, we aim to fill these gaps in the literature. In
addition, we explore the generality or lack of generality of the tax
remittance propositions by incorporating some of the insights of the
Coase literature; and we examine the extent to which the tax remit13 See, e.g., Harvey S. Rosen & Ted Gayer, Public Finance 80 (8th ed. 2008); Joseph E.
Stiglitz, Economics of the Public Sector 134-35, 219 (3d ed. 2000).
14 See text accompanying notes 22-25.
15 Some of this literature is cited and summarized in Medema & Zerbe, note 2, and in
David de Meza, Coase Theorem, in 1 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and Law
270 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
16 One exception is Joel Slemrod, Does It Matter Who Writes the Check to the Govern
ment? The Economics of Tax Remittance, 61 Nat'l Tax J. 251 (2008).
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tance invariance propositions depend on their underlying assump
tions, just as is the case with the Coase Theorem.
One contribution of the Article to the Coase literature is to empha
size the importance of the distinction between two general types of
situations: those in which the parties in question-the ones whose ac
tivities are jointly causing an external harm or cost-are in a contrac
tual or market (that is, buyer/seller) relationship with each other and
those in which they are not. Furthermore, we show how the same
distinction matters in the tax context.17 Thus, we explain how Coase's
distributional variance proposition applies only in nonmarket settings,
such as those involving conflicting land uses, as in the classic case of
the farmer and the rancher. In market settings, however, a sort of
distributional invariance proposition will hold. That is, regardless of
which party is assigned the obligation to remit a given cost, the actual
burden of that cost remittance obligation will depend on the relative
elasticities of supply and demand for whatever good or service is the
subject of the contractual relationship and the origin of the incurred
cost.18 In the economics literature, of course, a version of the same
point exists with respect to taxes (rather than harms) that are trig
gered by transactions; we gave it the name TRIPI above.
The primary normative conclusion that emerges from this Article's
blending of torts and tax can be summarized as follows: Parallel with
Calabresi's canonical formulation for the design of an optimal tort sys
tem, an optimal tax remittance regime requires that tax liabilities be
assigned so as to minimize the overall social costs of compliance and
administration, for a given level of achievement of the tax law's de
sired distributional and revenue goals. By compliance costs we mean
the private costs to the parties (and therefore the social costs) of com
plying with the law. By administrative costs, we mean the nonprivate
social costs of enforcing compliance with the law.19 As is true with the
administration of the civil liability system, the overall compliance and
administrative costs of a tax system will sometimes differ dramatically
depending on which party or class of parties (for example, employers
17 With any market purchase of goods or services, even in a spot market, there will be
some sort of explicit or implicit contract. For that reason, we use the terms "market set
ting" and "contractual setting" synonymously.
18 Richard Craswell ably demonstrates this point. See Richard Craswell, Passing on the
Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 Stan. L.
Rev. 361 , 366-67 (1991). Craswell's article focuses on the contractual relationship between
injurers and victims (such as product manufacturers and product consumers). Our analysis
focuses on situations in which two or more parties are collaborating in some activity that
causes harm to a third party. Id. at 361-98.
19 We do not regard fines that are imposed as part of an enforcement regime as social
costs, since fines are transfers of resources from one party to another. However, we do
regard the costs of administering and enforcing a system of fines as real social costs.
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versus employees, consumers versus retail businesses) is saddled with
the legal obligation to transfer the tax monies to the government.
Thus, optimal tax policy in some situations may call for assigning the
tax remittance obligation to the lowest-compliance-cost tax remitter
that is, the party with the lowest private compliance costs per dollar of
tax remitted. By contrast, it sometimes will be optimal to assign the
remittance obligation to the party for whom the administrative (or
enforcement) cost per dollar of tax revenue raised is lowest-or the
lowest-administrative-cost tax remitter. For one example, if the remit
tance obligation is assigned to a party who is innately dishonest
(someone who has not internalized the norm of tax law compliance)
and who is engaged in a business that provides numerous low-cost
opportunities for evasion, then either much of the tax will go uncol
lected (assuming a fixed IRS enforcement budget) or the cost of col
lection for the government will be much higher than if the remittance
obligation were imposed on an inherently compliant (well-socialized)
party.20
For the same reasons, the government will want to avoid placing the
remittance obligation on the lowest-cost liability avoider; that is, the
party who can most cheaply (in terms of private costs) avoid enforce
ment of the tort or tax law. This would be the party for whom it is
most administratively expensive for the government to make comply.
What this implies is that, contrary to the nai."ve interpretation of the
Coase Theorem and of TRIPs (but consistent with the Calabresian
notion of the least-cost harm avoider), overall social welfare will be
maximized only if the tax planning authority takes into account the
relative compliance and administrative costs in assigning tax remit
tance obligations.
One can distinguish between the obligation to remit a tax-to trans
fer resources to the government-and the obligation to report or in
form the government about a tax liability. An example of the former
is the obligation placed on employers to remit withholding taxes on
employees' wages. An example of the latter is the employers' obliga
tion to submit W-2 forms to the Service detailing the amount of wages
paid to employees. As we discuss further below, both of these obliga
tions are important to tax enforcement, although we emphasize remit
tance. 21 Tax-remittance and information-reporting obligations usually
go together (that is, a party with a remittance obligation usually also
20 Of course, an individual's willingness to comply voluntarily with the law, in the ab
sence of a threat of external punishment, is not necessarily an inherent trait. Society actu
ally spends resources to inculcate such values. For purposes of this Article, however, we
ignore the social costs of instilling in individuals the willingness to comply in the absence of
a threat of external punishment.
21 See text accompanying notes 106-37.

Imaged with the Permission ofN.Y.U Tax Law Review

802

TAX LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:

has an information reporting obligation-at least insofar as the act of
remitting itself is a type of information reporting); however, the link
between remittance and reporting is not logically necessary and in
theory could be split up. We discuss this possibility below.22
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II offers a primer on the
Coase Theorem, beginning with the classic case of neighbor external
izing on neighbor (farmer and rancher), and it explains the basic in
variance propositions. Part III shifts the focus to Coasean situations
involving buyers and sellers in a market or contractual relationship,
buyers and sellers whose market interactions cause harm to third par
ties. Using supply-and-demand diagrams, we illustrate (in a new way)
some of the most basic findings of the economic analysis of law, in
cluding both the Coasean invariance and efficiency propositions and
the Calabresian least-cost avoider idea. Also in Part III we make an
efficiency argument for vicarious employer liability for employee torts
and suggest this doctrine in theory could be expanded in certain situa
tions to (1) independent contractors and (2) torts beyond the scope of
employment. Our analysis builds on the standard law and economics
analysis of vicarious liability, but emphasizes the need to minimize not
only the costs of third-party harms but also administrative costs.
Part IV then moves from torts to tax-specifically, to taxes trig
gered by buyer/seller market relationships, such as employer/em
ployee interactions. That Part uses supply-and-demand curves to
illustrate the tax remittance invariance propositions in their classic
form, as found in every public finance textbook, under the assump
tions of zero (or symmetrical) compliance and administrative costs.
Part IV then uses those same diagrams to explain how the invariance
propositions no longer apply under the more realistic assumptions of
asymmetric compliance and administrative costs. More specifically,
we show that the optimal assignment of tax remittance responsibility
(as between buyer and seller) turns on which assignment minimizes
the sum of compliance and administrative costs incurred to raise a
given amount of revenue. We argue that, in general, the least-overall
cost tax remitter, for taxes triggered by buyer/seller transactions, will
be the larger, wealthier party-both because there are economies of
scale to enforcement against large tax remitter's and because wealth
ier taxpayers are less likely to be judgment-proof.
Part V discusses some of the real-world implications of our analysis,
both normative and positive. As a positive matter, our analysis pro
vides an explanation for why the U.S. income tax system and most
other income tax systems require employers to remit the bulk of their
employee's personal income tax liabilities. Likewise, our analysis ex22

See text accompanying notes 146-52.
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plains why the remittance obligation for sales taxes is usually imposed
on sellers rather than buyers. In addition, our framework explains
why tax remittance obligations are generally made mandatory (or
nontransferable) in the sense that Coasean bargaining over the tax
remittance obligation is not permitted. Finally, our analysis also helps
to explain why the remittance obligation for the gift tax is imposed,
initially, on the donor and, secondarily, on the donee.
In addition to providing a way of understanding current tax law, our
framework also suggests some possible reforms of existing tax en
forcement policy. For example, we argue, under certain conditions,
for expanding employers' tax remittance obligation to include pay
ments to independent contractors, as employers in those situations are
more likely to be the least-cost remitters-both in terms of compli
ance and administrative costs. In other words, the existing distinction
between employees and independent contractors, which may be opti
mal for tort law purposes, may not be optimally drawn for tax remit
tance purposes. In addition, we explore the possibility of expanding
the role of employers as remitters for their employees' (and contrac
tors') tax liabilities even for income earned outside of the employment
(or contractual) relationship. We also point out that current withhold
ing rules with respect to tip income of employees in service businesses
(especially in restaurants) could be strengthened to exploit the cheap
est-cost remitter idea. With the tipping example, we also explore fur
ther the distinction between remittance and reporting and why the
latter is not always a substitute for the former.
Also in this Part we suggest generally that remittance responsibility
for business or corporate remitters should be tied to the size of the
remitter; that is, the larger the firm (in terms of gross revenue, profits,
or assets), the stronger the argument for expanding their compulsory
remittance responsibility. Moving beyond income taxes, our analysis
explains why, under certain conditions, it will be more efficient to im
pose in rem tax liability for property taxes (where the remittance obli
gation is imposed, in effect, on a piece of property rather than on a
person) rather than standard in personam liability and why nonstan
dard withholding regimes, including so-called "reverse withholding,''
under which remittance responsibility is triggered by any commercial
interaction with difficult-to-tax parties, can achieve the desired level
and distribution of tax collection at the lowest possible overall cost.
We conclude by considering some qualifications to our analysis, in
cluding behavioral, political economy, and transition issues. One
qualification deserves a mention at the outset: Our analysis ignores
international, or more generally cross-jurisdictional, issues. That is,
we assume that all of the relevant parties, all of the parties to whom
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the tax (or, for that matter, tort) remittance obligation might conceiv
ably be assigned are within the relevant jurisdiction. As our analysis
shows the importance of the assignment of remittance responsibility,
the existence of jurisdictional borders beyond which remittance re
sponsibility may not be assigned is a serious complication. Moreover,
the possibility of parties avoiding remittance responsibility by locating
outside of the relevant jurisdiction obviously presents a serious prob
lem for any regime of tax (or tort) enforcement.
II.

A PRIMER ON CoAsE: FARMERS, RANCHERS, AND
OTHER "NEIGHBORS"

The Coase Theorem makes what now seems like an obvious point:
In a world with zero transaction costs, the initial assignment of a legal
right or entitlement will not affect the allocation of resources, because
the affected parties will always bargain to the efficient result, so long
as everyone involved is rational (in the way that economists normally
mean that term) and the entitlement in question is alienable (that is,
the entitlement can be transferred). Before exploring this conclusion,
it is useful to clarify what is meant by the term "legal entitlement" in
this context. In general, the Coasean logic has been applied to situa
tions in which the action of one party causes some harm or imposes
some cost on another party-the classic negative externality.23 The
entitlement at issue, then, is the right to avoid negative consequences
of the action: either the right of "the injurer" to impose the cost on
others or the right of "the victim" to prevent the harm or to insist on
compensation for it.24
The quintessential example of the Coase Theorem in action, from
Coase himself, involves conflicting land uses, specifically neighboring
landowners, a cattle rancher and a corn farmer.25 The Coasean ques
tion, then, is who, as between the farmer and the rancher, should be
legally responsible for the crop damage caused when the rancher's
cows happen to trespass on the farmer's property and damage his
23 Of course, a symmetrical Coasean story can be told for positive externalities, where
the externality is not a cost or harm but some benefit that is bestowed unintentionally by
one party on another. In those settings too, if transaction costs are zero, people are ra
tional, and entitlements are freely tradable, parties will bargain to the efficient result. Fol
lowing the literature, we tend to focus on negative externalities.
24 If the victim (the party who suffers the harm in the first instance) is given the entitle
ment to be free from harm, a second issue is what sort of rule would be used to protect that
entitlement: a property rule or a liability rule. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed,
Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L.
Rev. 1089 (1972). If the entitlement is protected by a property rule, the victim has the legal
right to obtain an injunction to stop the harm-causing activity in question. If it is protected
by a liability rule, the victim's legal remedies are limited to an ex post suit for damages.
25 Coase, note 1, at 2-8.
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corn.26 Or, put in terms of this Article's framework, who should be
assigned the remittance obligation with respect to the crop damage
caused by any cattle that stray onto the farmer's property. If the
rancher is legally required to remit to the farmer an amount of money
equal to his corn damage, we would say that the entitlement rests with
the farmer and the remittance obligation with the rancher. And if the
rancher is not required to remit the money for any harm caused by his
straying cows on the farmer's property, we would say that the remit
tance obligation rests with the farmer (and the legal entitlement with
the rancher).27
What Coase demonstrated was that, in a frictionless world, it does
not matter (from an efficiency perspective) how the legal entitlement
(or remittance obligation) is assigned.28 The efficient, joint wealth
maximizing outcomes will eventually be reached through a process
that is now sometimes referred to as "Coasean bargaining." If it is
efficient to produce cattle but not corn on two adjoining pieces of
property, or the reverse, the neighboring landowners will bargain to
that result.29 And they will do so whether the entitlement is placed
with the farmer or with the rancher. If efficiency calls for both corn
and cattle to be produced but for a fence to be erected between the
two properties, then that is what will happen, and it will happen in the
most efficient way possible, with the parties agreeing that the best
fence builder should do the job.30 This is Calabresi's cheapest-cost
26

Id. at 2.
Of course, however the remittance obligation for the costs of damaged corn is allo
cated between farmer and rancher, the actual economic burden of this obligation may then
be "passed on" to the farmer's employees or customers, or to those of the ranchers, de
pending on, among other things, the relative elasticities of relevant supply and demand in
those markets. This is unlikely to occur, though, if the legal assignment and subsequent
bargains apply to just one rancher and farmer, as the prices of the commodities will be set
in a much larger market. We have more to say about this sort of cost pass-through at text
accompanying notes 28-40.
28 See Coase, note 1, at 8.
29 For example, imagine that the lost profit to the farmer of not being able to grow and
sell his corn (should the rancher next door be given the entitlement to ignore the damage
caused by his cattle) would be $100; and the cost to the rancher of not being able to have
cattle would be $150 in lost profit. In that simple case, if the social planner were to give the
entitlement initially to the rancher, the rancher would indeed decide to have cattle, letting
them roam the countryside, and would make $150 of profit. The farmer, anticipating the
rancher's behavior (and the potential damage to his crops), would opt not to plant corn
and would thereby lose $100 of potential corn profit. So we would have cattle but not corn
from these two landowners, and this, on the facts, would be the efficient result as it maxi
mizes the joint benefit to the parties of their uses of their land net of costs.
30 Imagine that in the previous example the farmer could build a fence for $75 that
would make it possible for both the farmer to have his corn and the rancher to have her
cattle but, for whatever reason, the rancher's cost of building a fence was much higher
say, $200. Obviously, the parties under the Coasean assumptions would agree to have the
farmer build the fence, and this would happen regardless of the initial assignment of enti27
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harm avoider idea, and the law can achieve this result in a Coasean
world simply by setting the initial legal entitlements one way or the
other and letting the parties negotiate. The same analysis can be ap
plied to any negative externality: pollution, automobile accidents,
whatever.31 As long as transaction costs are assumed to be zero (and
everyone is rational), all affected parties will take part in the Coasean
bargaining process; all externalities will be internalized. There will be
the "right," or social-welfare-maximizing amount of the activity and
all cost-justified investments in cost reduction will be made. In the
torts literature, these latter two effects are known as activity-level ef
fects and the care-level effects. 32
Numerous criticisms of the Coase Theorem have been advanced
over the years, both of the efficiency proposition and the invariance
proposition. Some scholars, for example, have pointed out that invari
ance will not hold when there is a divergence between the amount a
party is "willing to pay" to acquire an entitlement and the amount he
is "willing to accept" to give up the same entitlement, due perhaps to
the kind of endowment effect discussed in prospect theory.33 This
kind of effect has been confirmed in empirical studies, and it can lead
to invariance of outcomes-though not to inefficiency, assuming a
world of zero transaction costs.34 In addition to the willing to pay/
willing to accept critique, there are game-theoretic objections to both
the invariance and the efficiency propositions. Many of the paradig
matic examples of Coasean bargaining involve situations that could
give rise to strategic behavior by the parties, which may lead to a re
sult that is not joint wealth maximizing. For example, if the interactlements. (In the example, so long as a fully effective fence could be built for less than
$250 (the total combined profit of farming and ranching), then the fence would be built.)
This conclusion follows from the fact that having the farmer build the fence would produce
the highest joint value from the two properties. ($150 cattle profit + $100 corn profit - $75
fence cost= $175.) In Calabresi's famous phrasing, the farmer in this situation would be
the "cheapest cost avoider" and therefore, under Coasean assumptions, would end up with
the responsibility for building the fence. In this Article we use the term cheapest-cost or
least-cost harm avoider in cases where the private costs are also social costs; we use the
term cheapest- or least-cost liability avoiders in cases where the private costs are not social
costs or, in particular, when the private benefits of tax avoidance do not correspond to
social benefits. This is just another way of illustrating that, in the absence of transaction
costs, the parties will internalize all external costs and therefore will take all cost-justified
measures to reduce those costs. And the same bargaining that will assign the entitlement
to the party with the highest-valued use will also ensure that the party who is best able to
reduce the size of the negative externality (the cheapest-cost harm avoider) will do so. It is
all part of the Coasean bargain.
3 1 See, e.g., Polinsky, note 8, at 43-56, 108-23.
32 See Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law 26 (1987).
33 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Marginal Utility and the Coase Theorem, 75 Cornell
L. Rev. 783, 799 (1990).
34 Id.
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tions between the parties are modeled as a noncooperative game with
asymmetric information, strategic behavior of various sorts may pre
vent an efficient outcome.35 This is sometimes referred to as the bar
gaining problem or the problem of bilateral monopoly.36 Some
commentators argue that the bilateral monopoly critique fails to take
seriously the zero-transaction cost assumption, which includes an as
sumption of perfect information on both sides (including information
about the payoffs to each side of all possible outcomes).37 Under
those assumptions, bargaining failures would not occur. But even so,
it can hardly be denied that in many real-world settings between two
(or relatively few) bargaining parties some value-maximizing out
comes are not achieved, either because of transaction costs (conven
tionally understood) or by strategic behavior; and the relevance of the
Coase Theorem to those situations can reasonably be questioned.
Notably the traditional Coasean bargaining situation involves con
flicting land uses in which there is no prior contractual relationship
between the two parties. The injurer and the victim are not in a con
tractual seller-buyer relationship with each other. Rather, they are
just neighbors, and their separate activities happen to conflict in the
sense that, because the activities take place in close proximity to each
other, a particular external cost arises, the remittance obligation for
which needs to be assigned, explicitly or implicitly. The same would
be true for the property owner whose manufacturing business pollutes
the neighbors' air or water. In that case, the pollution would not arise
out of the transaction between the manufacturer and its consumer/
neighbors, but is unrelated to any such transaction.
There are two interesting implications from this noncontractual set
ting. First, unlike a competitive market where the market price is set
by the intersection of supply and demand, in a classic Coasean con
flicting land-use situation the distribution of the gains from trade is
determined by bargaining between the parties. Thus, assuming some
sort of bargain is reached (and the bilateral monopoly problem over
come), the distribution of the gains from trade will depend on the par
ties' relative bargaining positions.38 The other interesting implication
35
36

Donald H. Regan, The Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15 J.L. & Econ. 427 (1972).
See Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jules L. Coleman, The Philosophy of Law: An Introduction
to Jurisprudence 258-62 (1984).
37 Harold Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. Legal Stud. 223
(1972); Jeffrey F. Jaffe, The "Coase Theorem": A Reexamination-Comment, 89 Q.J.
Econ. 660 (1976).
38 Continuing with the example of the farmer and rancher who are neighbors (and
whose land uses are incompatible), imagine what would happen in a Coasean world if the
"entitlement" not to remit is given to the farmer. Given that the rancher can make $150
ranching, and the farmer only $100 farming, the rancher presumably will pay the farmer to
purchase his entitlement-that is, pay him to remit. Thus, the efficient outcome would be
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of the standard Coasean noncontractual setting is that, precisely be
cause these are bargaining situations, the assignment of the legal enti
tlement to one side or the other will have distributional consequences.
We call this insight the Coasean distributional variance proposition.39
The point is that having the legal right to impose costs onto your
neighbor, or the legal right to prevent your neighbor from imposing
costs onto you, is itself a distinct and valuable asset. Thus, if the rule
has always has been that ranchers are entitled to let their cattle roam
the countryside, switching the entitlement to farmers would cause a
drop in the value of the affected ranches relative to the affected farms.
In effect, one of the costs of farming would have disappeared and
reappeared as a cost of ranching. Such a change in legal rules would
be akin to a lump sum transfer from farmers to ranchers. The same
analysis could be applied to the example of the polluting manufac
turer. If manufacturers suddenly become responsible for the pollution
they impose on their neighbors, the manufacturing business would
then be less profitable and precisely by the amount of the expected
value of the cost of pollution or pollution abatement. Likewise, the
value of owning a car is somewhat less if the owner has to pay for
injuries to pedestrians than if he does not.
These distributional consequences are diminished to the extent the
affected assets of the parties are costlessly convertible to another
equally profitable use or, conversely, that free entry into an industry
dissipates the long-run gain in profits that would otherwise accrue to
those already in business.40 Moreover, to the extent the harm in ques
tion can be prevented with a trivial investment on the part of either
party, the distributional consequences of the assignment will be simi
larly trivial. For example, in the extreme case, if ranch land could just
as easily be used for farming (say the land is equally profitable put to
either use such that the choice to farm or ranch was virtually a matter
of indifference to the landowner), and assuming zero costs of con
verting from one to the other, there would be no distributional effect
of altering the entitlement at issue. When the rule changed and ranch
ers were required to corral their cattle or pay for the damage caused,
the rancher could simply switch to farming. Of course, if ranchland is
achieved. The precise amount the rancher would end up paying the farmer is impossible to
determine ex ante. It would fall somewhere between $100 and $150, with the exact amount
depending on the relative bargaining power of the two parties.
39 As we discuss below, the Coasean distributional variance proposition does not apply
in competitive market settings where the harm (or the tax) in question arises out of a
contractual market transaction. See text accompanying notes 51-56.
40 This argument would not apply if the change in entitlement applied to just one adj a
cent farmer and rancher pair; in this case it would be capitalized into the value of one or
the other ongoing concerns.
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not costlessly convertible to farmland or if the farmer has made ranch
ing-specific investments in livestock or equipment, then a change in
the rule would affect the value of the rancher's assets. The same
would be true on the farmer side of things, as the value of farming
specific investments would presumably rise. We could tell the same
story in the other direction, with farmers losing value and ranchers
gaining; or we could substitute any other example of a negative exter
nality for that the rancher/farmer scenario. Hence, if a polluter could
cheaply make some change in their operations that would eliminate
the resulting pollutants, then the polluter's entitlement to impose
costs on its neighbor would not be worth very much. And so on. Of
course, notwithstanding this caveat, there will be substantial activity
specific investments on one side or the other in many situations such
that distributional variance in these types of situations is a nontrivial
possibility.
III.
A.

THE MARKET SETTING: SELLERS, BUYERS, AND INJURED
THIRD PARTIES
Efficiency and Distributive Invariance: Assuming Zero (or
Homogeneous) Compliance and Administrative Costs

To move the analysis one step closer to our analogy between torts
and tax, we shift from the nonmarket "neighbor" setting to the long
run equilibrium of a market setting involving numerous buyers and
sellers transacting over a homogeneous product in which no buyer or
seller has market power.41 Thus, imagine that there are two classes of
parties who are buyers and sellers with respect to each other; and sup
pose further that the production or consumption of the good or ser
vice sometimes harm third parties. For example, the sellers could be
makers of component parts that are sold to buyers who use those
parts to manufacture a final product, which is then sold to retail cus
tomers-some of whom end up being injured by the product. Alter
natively, the sellers could be manufacturers of products that are sold
to consumers who sometimes use the products in ways that injure
third parties. For the purpose of illustration, for now we presume that
the market in question is a labor market and that the buyers are em
ployers and the sellers are workers. The problem, then, is that these
labor market transactions not only produce value for the parties in
volved (in terms of wages paid for services received and employer
41 Although these competitive market assumptions are useful for purposes of illustra
tion, as they allow us to construct simple supply and demand curves to demonstrate our
basic points of efficiency and distributional invariance, these assumptions are not necessary
to produce the invariance results.
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business profits), they also sometimes cause external harms to third
parties.42 Suppose for now that these harms arise within the workers'
"scope of employment," in the sense that the harm can reasonably be
said to be in connection with the job that the worker is doing for the
employer. Imagine also that transactions costs between employers
and workers are relatively low; that is, because we have a competitive
labor market, we assume that employers and workers reach joint
wealth-maximizing employment contracts. We also assume, however,
that the third-party victims are not part of this competitive labor mar
ket and that transaction costs prevent them from engaging in Coasean
bargaining with either the employers or workers whose interaction
generates the harm. The third parties can do nothing to reduce this
expected harm. Either employers or the workers can take steps to
reduce or eliminate the expected harm that their joint actions impose
on third parties, but neither is a "cheaper-cost harm avoider" than the
other; that is, the cost to either of them per amount of reduction in
expected harm is the same. In addition, we ignore the consequences
of the harm to the third parties, as we are focusing only on the deter
rence or cost internalization function of liability law.43 Finally, assume
that the administrative costs associated with employer or worker lia
bility are equal. (We have more to say on this assumption below.)44
Now we have a classic negative externality, and the relevant policy
question is to whom we should assign the remittance responsibility for
this third-party harm: the workers (the sellers of labor) or the em
ployers (the buyers of labor).45 To answer these questions, we depict
our hypothesized labor market in a series of standard supply-and-de
mand diagrams. We start with the long-run equilibrium condition
prior to the discovery that the buyer/seller transactions are causing
harm to third parties. This market is described in Figure 1.
42 Below we draw a n analogy between these harms caused t o third parties and taxes
owed to the government. See discussion in Section 111.D.
43 This approach can be justified if we imagine that all third-party victims are insured
directly for these harms through first-party insurance policies and can recover directly from
their insurers for the harm. In that case, the tort actions that shift these costs either to
buyers or sellers of the product or service that caused the third-party harm would be
brought in the form of subrogation suits by the first-party insurance companies.
44 See discussion in Section 111.C.
45 Notice that we do not consider imposing the cost on the third-party victim. This is
because we have assumed that either employers or employees could efficiently reduce or
eliminate the expected harm, but that the third parties could do nothing to affect the ex
pected harm. Also, an implicit assumption here is that the only available regulatory re
sponse is ex post liability for harm. In fact, as we discuss below, ex ante regulation is also
an option; however, it is likely to be very costly, a fact that will obviously have implications
for the choice of the optimal legal response to the externality. We return to this assump
tion below. See Section III.C.
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The aggregate demand curve in Figure 1, labeled D, shows for each
price (or wage) the total quantity of units of labor that would be de
manded by employers. The aggregate supply curve, labeled S, shows
the aggregate quantity of units of labor supplied by employees at any
given price. The equilibrium price is p0, because only at that price will
supply equal demand, and therefore there will be no upward or down
ward pressure on the wage. At the equilibrium, x0 units of labor will
be provided by workers. The areas denoted by triangles CS and PS
represent employer surplus and employee surplus, respectively, which
is the total dollar value attributable to the ability to provide labor at
the equilibrium wage and quantity.
Now suppose that it is discovered that the particular activity that
the employees are engaged in on behalf of the employer will on occa
sion cause harm to third parties. The question then is whether that
tort liability (the legal obligation to remit the tort damages to the in
jured plaintiffs) should be assigned in general to employers or to the
employees-and whether it matters. Put in classic Coasean terms:
What difference does the assignment of this entitlement/obligation
make if we assume zero transaction costs (as between employer and
employee), full rationality, and free transferability of legal entitle
ments? The answer is none, not even a distributional difference. This
is because, given the Coasean assumptions, market forces will in the
long run push employers and workers to reach the efficient result.
What's more, because of the price nexus here between employers and
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workers, the way in which this new external cost will be borne by the
parties will depend entirely on the elasticities of supply and demand
for the workers' labor and not at all on the initial assignment of the
legal entitlement, that is, the remittance obligation.
To illustrate this basic point, we add to our model a new cost, which
we assume, for now, is equal to c per unit of labor sold no matter
whether employers or workers are held liable. This assumption is
built on two sub-assumptions. One, it entails an assumption that the
cost rises proportionally with the aggregate amount of the good or
service sold and consumed (here, labor). This assumption implies that
the cost can be represented by either a parallel shift in the supply or
demand curve in the figures below. Two, it entails the assumption dis
cussed above that neither employers nor workers are cheaper-cost
harm avoiders than the other. That the per-unit cost of liability is c,
whether employers or workers are assigned remittance responsibility,
also implies that employers and workers have the same risk prefer
ences or the same costs of purchasing liability insurance. With these
new assumptions, Figure 2 depicts the situation in which the obliga
tion to remit the cost of third-party injuries is assigned to workers, the
suppliers of labor.
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Because the remittance obligation for this per-unit cost is legally
assigned to workers, it means that, at whatever price they would have

Imaged with the Permission ofN.Y.U Tax Law Review

2010]

OF COASE, CALABRESI, AND OPTIMAL TAX LIABILITY

813

required to provide any given output of labor previously, they now
require a price that is c higher. This fact is represented by a parallel
upward shift in the labor supply curve by a distance of c. The new
supply curve is labeled S', which means that, at any quantity of labor
provided, the height of S' represents the wage received by workers
that would have to be necessary to induce this output. The height of S
at any given output represents what the worker would receive for la
bor, net of the new cost c, if that much labor were sold. After the
introduction of this new cost, the new long-run equilibrium wage paid
by employers is p1 and the equilibrium output is x1; the wage net of the
cost is qi, which is equal to p1 - c.
Because there is a new cost that has been introduced into this mar
ket, it should not be a surprise that there is a loss of social welfare,
which is represented by the decline in overall worker and employer
surplus, shown as the area EBCF in Figure 2. The question now is,
given the particular assignment of remittance obligations (here to
workers), who actually bears the burden of the cost, where by "bear
ing the burden" we again mean whose welfare or utility is reduced as a
result of this new cost.46 The naiVe answer would be that the workers
bear the cost, because they are legally responsible for remittance.
However, because of the change in the prices of labor caused by the
increased cost that shifts the supply curve, and because of the diver
gence between the wage rate paid by the employer (p1) and the wage
net of cost received by the worker (q1) in the new equilibrium, the
allocation of the economic burden of the new cost is not determined
by the assignment of the remittance obligation. Rather, it is deter
mined by the elasticities of supply and demand for the workers' labor.
To see this point, refer again to Figure 2. How the discovery of the
new labor cost will affect the welfare of workers and employers is ap
proximated by the change in employer and worker surplus, respec
tively .47 The decline in employer surplus is the area IEBJ, which
represents the loss of utility to employers due to the increased price
for labor and the reduced consumption of labor. IEBJ is equal to the
rectangle !ELI (which is (p1 p0)x1 or the portion of the aggregate
cost of third-party risk borne by employers at the new equilibrium
quantity) plus the triangle EBL (which is the loss of value to employ
ers resulting from the reduction in the quantity purchased). By simi-

46 The loss of total surplus in Figure 2 is the area EBCF; this is the sum of EGCF, the
cost c times actual output xl, or cxl, and the area EBG, which represents the social cost of
forgoing the output xO - xl. As shown later, the triangle is analogous to the classic dead
weight loss, or Harberger, triangle that is well-known in tax analysis. See generally Arnold
C. Harberger, The Measurement of Waste, 54 Am. Econ. Rev. 58 (1964).
47 Here employer and worker surplus are just specific cases of consumer and producer
surplus.
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lar logic, the loss in worker surplus is JBGK, which is due to the
reduction in the net-of-cost price of the amount of labor produced,
JLGK,48 and the loss of value to workers from the reduction in quan
tity of labor supplied, the triangle LBG. The divergence between the
equilibrium wage paid by the employer (p1) and the equilibrium net
of-harm-related-cost price received by the worker (q1) is key here.
The extent to which these two prices will diverge from the original
equilibrium price (p0) that prevailed prior to the discovery of the new
cost, will determine how this new cost affects the welfare of employers
and workers. This "split" of the new cost in turn depends on the rela
tive elasticity of supply and demand: the higher the relative elasticity
of demand for labor is (that is, the flatter the curve), the lower (p1 - p0)
will be relative to (p0 - q1), and the lower the relative burden borne by
the employers will be. The same point could be made about supply:
the more elastic the supply of labor, the lower will be (p0 - q1) relative
to (p1 p0). In sum, as between workers and employers, the (rela
tively) more elastic party-the one with better alternatives to this par
ticular employment relationship-will bear less of the economic
burden of the new third-party liability.
Now for the invariance point mentioned in the Introduction. The
distribution of the economic burden imposed by these new costs of
third-party liability between sellers and buyers (workers and employ
ers here) will depend on the relative elasticities, and that distribu
tional outcome will be invariant to the assignment of the initial legal
obligation. This point is illustrated by changing the example to assign
to employers rather than workers the legal obligation to remit the cost
of the third-party liability. Figure 3 shows the results.
The value of labor to employers, net of the new liability cost, is
unchanged; therefore, the D curve still represents the willingness to
pay net of this cost. The price employers are willing to pay, however,
is less than before. Thus, instead of a shift in supply, we have a down
ward shift in the demand curve, from D to D', by an amount equal to
the new liability cost, c. The new demand curve intersects the supply
curve at point G, and q1 is the new equilibrium price paid to the work
ers. The total cost to the employer is qi + c, which is equal to p1•
Comparing Figure 3 to Figure 2, we see that everything is the same,
including the total wage paid by employers, the price received by
workers, and the quantity of labor. Both the employer surplus and
the worker surplus are the same in both situations, as is the loss of
surplus caused by the discovery of the new liability cost. In Figure 3
the lost surplus is the area ABGH, which is exactly equal to area
48 This is calculated simply by multiplying the change in the price received by producers
(pO - ql) by the new equilibrium quantity produced, xl.

Imaged with the Permission ofN.Y.U Tax Law Review

2010]

OF COASE, CALABRESI, AND OPTIMAL TAX LIABILITY

815

FIGURE 3
price
s

E
Po

q1

J

_

K

_ _ _ _ _ _

.l-- �- - - 8

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_ _

:

G:

c

D
D

quantity
FEBC in Figure 2, and both are equal to cx1
and efficiency consequences are identical.
B.
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Differential Prevention Costs: The Least-Cost Harm Avoider

Note that the invariance result just described remains unchanged if
we relax the assumption that neither party is a cheaper-cost harm
avoider than the other, so long as we maintain the Coasean assump
tions of zero transaction costs as between buyer and seller and the
free transferability of interests. Imagine, for example, that workers
happen to be the cheaper-cost harm avoiders, such that the per-unit
cost to them of being assigned legal responsibility for third-party
harms is not c but the smaller c'; whereas the cost of third-party liabil
ity remains c for employers.49 Thus, were it not for the Coase Theo49 Thus, we are assuming for simplicity that either the employee can take steps to reduce
the third-party accident risk or the employer can do so, but not both simultaneously. Thus,
the question is which of them should be given assigned the legal responsibility for the full
harm. In many situations, of course, it will be optimal for both the employer and the
employee to make investments in "care" (expenditures to reduce the expected costs of
third-party harm) . In such situations, there is no single cheapest-cost harm avoider. This
complication will not matter in a contractual setting in which buyers and sellers, through
their Coasean interactions with each other, can create incentives for both parties to take
optimal care. We use the cheapest-cost harm avoider example for ease of exposition. We
also assume that the only possible liability rule is strict liability for third-party harm, which
will be imposed either on employers or employees. The analysis could also be applied to
fault-based liability rules.
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rem, one might conclude, by a comparison of Figure 4 and Figure 3,
that the overall loss of social welfare caused by third-party liability
would be lower if the legal obligation were assigned to workers. Not
so, under Coase. That is, even if the remittance obligation were im
posed initially on employers, competition would induce workers to of
fer to assume liability for the third-party harm (and to purchase
insurance for the risk at cost c'), which employers would accept, be
cause the c' is by assumption lower than the cost, c, of the employers'
purchasing insurance against the risk on their own. Thus, no matter
how the initial legal obligation is assigned, with frictionless transfera
bility the remittance obligation between employer and worker (be
tween buyer and seller) would end up in the efficient place: on
workers. And we would end up with Figure 4.50 Obviously, the same
sort of analysis could be done if the employer were the least-cost harm
avoider, in which case, regardless of the law's assignment of tort liabil
ity, we would expect the parties to agree to employment contracts that
placed tort liability on employers.
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This invariance conclusion, of course, does not imply that the as
sigriment of the legal responsibility for third-party liability is irrelevant
in a world with high transaction costs (as between employer and ems o In Figure 4, the reduction in equilibrium output is smaller compared to Figure 2 or
Figure 3. The increase in the wage paid is less, as is the decline in the wage received by the
worker. Finally, the social cost is lower, being equal to F'E'BC, or c'xl' + E'BG'.
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ployee) or in a world in which legal entitlements are nontransferable.
For example, if we imagine that transaction costs are high, the effi
cient result would be to assign the responsibility for third-party liabil
ity to the least-cost harm avoider-whichever party faced cost c'
rather than c-assuming the policymaker can determine with relative
ease who that is.51 If that happens to be the workers, the most effi
cient assignment of legal responsibility would entail worker liability; if
the employer, however, is the least-cost harm avoider, then the rule
should be employer liability. This is just standard Calabresi. Like
wise, even if transaction costs are low as between the market partici
pants whose transactions produce the third-party harm, if we imagine
that the legal entitlement in question will be made nontransferable,
then the initial legal rule will matter. Thus, for example, if workers
are the least-cost avoiders of third-party harm (that is, the cost would
be c' for workers and c for employers) and we place the legal responsi
bility on employers, and (importantly) we make that legal assignment
nontransferable, then the parties will be made worse off. Indeed,
even workers, the likely intended beneficiaries of such a rule, may be
made worse off. 52
C.

Differential Administrative Costs: Insolvent Defendants,
Least-Cost Liability Avoider

In the last Section we concluded that, in a situation in which a
buyer-seller market transaction gives rise to a third-party harm, it
would be optimal to assign the legal responsibility for the third-party
harm to the least-cost harm avoider, as between the buyer and the
seller, assuming (among other things) that the cost of identifying the
latter is relatively low.53 In this Section we address an important qual
ification to that conclusion. This qualification concerns the relative
administrative costs of various alternative forms of regulation, as com
pared with the cost of the negative externality at issue. For example,
consider how the analysis changes if the least-cost harm avoider is
judgment-proof; that is, the least-cost harm avoider does not have as
sets sufficient to cover the potential tort liability and therefore, to the
extent of the excess, will ignore the threat of ex post liability.
5 1 More specifically, assuming the cost of identifying the cheapest-cost harm avoider is
lower than the cost savings from moving from c to c'.
52 Craswell, note 18, at 362, 369-70.
53 We are assuming that the third-party victim can do nothing to reduce the risk of harm
and is fully insured against the consequences of the harm. Given that information is costly,
it may be impossible at reasonable cost for the social planner to determine who the cheap
est-cost harm avoider is. That is, both c and c' may not be cost-justifiably observable by the
legal authority. If that is the case, then the assignment of the obligation has to be made on
some other basis.
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To see how this new assumption alters the analysis, also assume that
workers are the least-cost harm avoiders. But imagine that they are
entirely judgment-proof. This is an extreme example, but it is not ut
terly fanciful. If the only assets the workers have are the equity in
their primary residences and their retirement accounts-assets that
are to some extent protected from tort creditors under state bank
ruptcy laws-they would indeed be largely judgment-proof.S4 In that
case, although the workers may be the least-cost harm avoiders, they
are also the least-cost liability avoiders. Being the cheaper-cost liabil
ity avoiders, however, makes them decidedly not the overall least-cost
alternative in terms of total social costs. To the contrary, in such a
situation, the overall cost to the plaintiff (or to the legal system in
general) of forcing the judgment-proof workers (and hence, through
the price mechanism, employers) to internalize third-party harm
would likely be extremely high. The reason is that policymakers
would have to resort to some other form of regulation, such as ex ante
command-and-control supervision of the worker's conduct, which is a
type of regulation that in many situations is considered to be more
expensive than simple ex post liability.ss In such a situation, the com
bined private compliance and public administrative costs associated
with internalizing the third-party harm to the workers might well ex
ceed the harm to the third-party. In a sense, therefore, the so-called
judgment-proof problem can be seen as an administrative- or en
forcement-cost problem.
Because of this judgment-proof/administrative-cost problem, if im
posing liability on the least-cost harm avoider (here, the worker) were
the only ex post liability option, the efficient result might simply be no
liability (that is, to leave the costs on the victims). However, that is
not the only ex post liability option. It is also possible to impose the
tort remittance responsibility on the next least-cost harm avoider
here the employers. And if employers are not judgment-proof, it may
generate lower overall social cost to impose liability on them rather

54 Some states limit the bankruptcy exemption available for retirement accounts and for
primary residences. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 4914 (exempting only $75,000 eq
uity in a principal residence with no exemption for an IRA); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 235,
§ 34A (LexisNexis 2010) (excluding deposits into the retirement account within five years
of declaration of bankruptcy in excess of 7% of debtor's total income).
55 It is generally thought that, where the judgment-proof problem is not present, ex post
liability is a cheaper way of internalizing negative externalities, unless we believe that regu
lators are likely to know more about the relevant risks than the parties involved. The
informational burden on the regulator of the ex post liability system is considered rela
tively low compared with ex ante regulation. See Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus
Negligence, 9 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1980); see also Donald Wittman, Prior Regulation vs. Post
Liability: The Choice Between Input and Output Monitoring, 6 J. Legal Stud. 193 (1977).
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than either (1) to impose liability on the workers, (2) to engage in ex
ante regulation, or (3) to leave the costs on the plaintiffs.
To see this point, go back to the example and assume that if workers
are assigned the third-party liabilities (and they are not judgment
proof), the per-unit cost of that liability is represented by c'; whereas,
if the liability is assigned to employers the per-unit cost would be the
larger cost, c. Thus, workers in this case are the least-cost harm
avoiders. If, however, employees are judgment-proof (requiring very
expensive ex ante regulation to internalize the cost of third-party
harms to this market), and if we include the administrative cost as part
of the overall social cost, then the full cost of internalizing the third
party harm would not be c' but c", which is, by assumption, even
larger than c. In this situation, overall social welfare will be maxi
mized by imposing liability on employers, who are, again, the next
least-cost harm avoiders.
A version of the foregoing argument-the combination of the least
cost harm avoider story and the judgment-proof defendant story-is
in fact the standard economic rationale for the tort concept of vicari
ous liability.56 "Vicarious liability" in the most general sense means to
hold one party strictly liable for the tort committed by another. The
primary justification for this sort of secondary liability indeed builds
on the idea that the former party may have some effective control
over the harm caused by the latter and may be more amenable to
regulation by ex post liability. Thus, under the general legal doctrine
of respondeat superior, whenever an agent, who is under the control
of a principal, commits a tort against a third party, the principal may
be held liable for the third-party harm, assuming the agent committed
the tort while acting within the scope of the agency relationship.57
Applying this principle to the employment context, if an employee,
while acting within the scope of her employment role, commits a tort
and causes a harm to some third party, the injured party can sue either
the employee directly for negligence or the employer vicariously, as
suming the plaintiff can establish the elements of a tort claim (duty,
breach, harm, and causation) against the employee. In most cases, of
course, the third party will sue both the employer and the employee,
who can be held jointly and severally liable for the employee's tort.58
56 Alan 0. Sykes, An Efficiency Analysis of Vicarious Liability Under the Law of
Agency, 91 Yale L.J. 168 (1981); Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the
Choice Between Enterprise and Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 Cal. L. Rev. 1345
(1982); Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 Yale L.J. 1231 (1984);
Shavell, note 32; Reinier H. Kraakman, Vicarious and Corporate Civil Liability, in 2 Ency
clopedia of Law and Economics, note 2, at 669, 670-71.
57 Restatement (Third) of Agency, §§ 2.04, 7.01-7.08 (2006).
5 8 See Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts 1078 (2000).
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Once a judgment is secured against both parties, the plaintiff can then
seek to enforce it against either defendant, or partly against one and
partly against the other, whatever is most expedient.59 And if the em
ployer is the only party who is not judgment-proof (either because the
employer is the only party with sufficient assets to cover the liability
or the only party with adequate liability insurance coverage), the judg
ment typically will be enforced against the employer. If the employer
is liable only vicariously (and not as a result of its own separate tort,
such as negligence), then traditionally the employer would be allowed
to seek "indemnity" from the employee.60 Interestingly, however, the
right of indemnification from employees is not often invoked, perhaps
because employers are, in effect, acting as the liability insurers of their
employees.61
The two primary efficiency justifications for vicarious liability of
employers for the torts of their employees involve either a least-cost
harm avoider type of argument (on the theory that employers will
often be in a better position than the employees to take cost-effective
steps to minimize the relevant expected harms) or a judgment-proof
or "deep-pocket" type of story.62 And the two arguments work to
gether in the way that is similar to the framework set out in this Arti
cle, although prior analyses of this question have not emphasized the
importance of comparative administrative costs. Thus, a case can be
made that in many situations the employer will be, if not the least-cost
harm avoider, a cheaper-cost harm avoider than the plaintiff. Moreo
ver, employees will often be partially or fully judgment-proof with re
spect to a potential tort judgment and thus partially if not totally
nonresponsive to the threat of legal liability, thus strengthening the
case for employer vicarious liability.
Similar arguments can be made for other types of vicarious liability.
For example, vicarious liability can also be imposed jointly and sever
ally on all of the partners in a joint enterprise for the tort of any other
partner acting within the scope of the partnership.63 In a more exId.
Id. at 1079. In other sorts of joint-and-several liability tort actions, where the defend
ants are not merely being held vicariously liable but are themselves legally responsible at
least in part for the tortious harm, then rather than indemnification, the defendant who is
forced to pay the judgment can seek "contribution" for the fair shares owed by the other
defendants. Id.
61 Indeed, employers typically purchase liability insurance that covers the run-of-the
mill negligence torts committed by their employees within the scope of employment. If
employers did start seeking indemnification from their employees for these torts, presuma
bly employees would then begin to purchase their own separate workplace liability
insurance.
62 See sources cited in note 56.
63 Dobbs, note 58, at 413.
59

60
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treme example of vicarious liability, some scholars and lawyers have
argued that gun manufacturers should be held vicariously liable for
the injuries and deaths caused by gun violence.64 (Congress and the
courts have rejected this argument.65) Joint-and-several liability
sometimes is also imposed in cases that are not normally characterized
as instances of vicarious liability where several parties contributed to a
single plaintiff injury. In any event, the argument for joint-and-sev
eral liability in these contexts (whether vicarious or not) can be put in
efficiency, cost-internalization terms that should at this point be
familiar.
Consider the hand-gun example again, which, though extreme,
makes the point: Even if gun-toting criminals are in some sense the
least-cost harm avoiders with respect to gun violence, they are also
often judgment-proof. What's more, individuals who are likely to use
guns to intentionally harm others are also often likely to expend con
siderable effort to avoid detection, which further raises the adminis
trative costs of enforcing the tort liability against them. By contrast,
the manufacturers of the guns that are used in those crime, if given the
proper incentive, may be able to do something at relatively low cost
(even if not the "lowest possible cost") to reduce the risk of harm due
to gun violence, perhaps by redesigning the guns or by altering the
way in which they are distributed. That is the care-level argument.
The activity-level argument would be similar: If we assume that gun
makers are solvent whereas criminal gun users are not (or that, more
generally, it is less expensive administratively to enforce the liability
on gun makers than criminal gun users), then shifting liability vicari
ously to the manufacturers could have beneficial activity-level effects,
as gun prices would adjust upward to reflect a larger share of the over
all social costs associated with gun sales.
We should also emphasize here an important limitation on vicarious
employer liability. As mentioned above, under the doctrine of re
spondeat superior, the employer is liable only for those torts commit
ted by employees while acting within the scope of employment.66
64 E.g., Rachana Bhowmik, Aiming for Accountability: How City Lawsuits Can Help
Reform an Irresponsible Gun Industry, 11 J.L. & Pol'y 67 (2002); Paul R. Bonney, Manu
facturers' Strict Liability for Handgun Injuries: An Economic Analysis, 73 Geo. L.J. 1437
(1985); Timothy D. Lytton, Tort Claims Against Gun Manufacturers for Crime-Related
Injuries: Defining a Suitable Role for the Tort System in Regulating the Firearms Industry,
65 Mo. L. Rev. 1, 2, 7-8 (2000).
65 In 2005 Congress enacted the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, which
exempts gun manufacturers and dealers from being held liable for crimes committed by
people using guns. Pub. L. No. 109-92, 119 Stat. 2095 (2005) (codified as 15 U.S.C.
§§ 7901-03 (2006) ).
66 The classic discussion of the scope-of-employment doctrine is Young B. Smith, Frolic
and Detour, 23 Colum. L. Rev. 444 (1923).
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(And as we discuss below, an efficiency argument can be made for
expanding that liability to include independent contractors as well, at
least in situations in which contractors are likely to be judgment
proof.67) Thus, if the worker causes harm while engaging in some ac
tivity that has nothing to do with his employment relationship with the
employer, the employer cannot be held vicariously liable for that loss.
The rationale for this so-called "scope-of-employment doctrine" is
straightforward: Whereas it might make sense to force the cost of any
harm that is caused by an enterprise to be borne by that enterprise
and (through the price mechanism) the parties who benefit from that
enterprise, the same argument does not apply to costs that are not
caused by the enterprise.68 The scope-of-employment doctrine is an
example of a more general point in tort law: For a tort defendant to
be held liable for the harm of another party, the injured party must
establish, among other things, a causal link between the harm and the
defendant.69
Much turns then on what counts as a causal link. Alan Sykes has
argued that the appropriate definition of causation in the vicarious
liability context is similar to the one that economists have argued for
in other tort contexts: "The crucial variable in this analysis is the ex
tent to which the employment relation increases the probability of
each wrong."70 Thus he argues that "[a]n enterprise 'fully causes' the
wrong of an employee if the dissolution of the enterprise and subse
quent unemployment of the employee would reduce the probability of
the wrong to zero. "71 If no such causal link exists between the
worker's employment with the employer and the harm caused to the
third party, then imposing liability for that cost on the employer
would, he argues, be inefficient for two reasons. First, such an expan
sion of vicarious liability would in effect tum the employer into the
worker's general liability insurer, which is probably not the most effi
cient risk-spreading arrangement.72 Second, such an allocation of lia
bility, by imposing an arbitrary cost on the employer, would have the
effect of inefficiently reducing the scale of the enterprise.73 To use an
67

See text accompanying notes 79-81.
This idea, sometimes referred to as "enterprise liability," can also be found in the
early work of Calabresi. See Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and
the Law of Torts, 70 Yale L.J. 499, 500 (1961).
69 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 430 (1965).
70 Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the
Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 563, 572
(1988).
7 1 Id.
n Id. at 574-75.
73 Id. at 575. Again, this notion of causation has been applied more generally to tort
law. Steven Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law of
68
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example outside of the employment context, it would be like making
gun makers liable in tort not for the gun-related injuries caused by
their customers, but for the auto-related injuries caused by their cus
tomers. Why should those auto-accident costs be assigned to the gun
manufacturing business merely because of the contractual nexus be
tween the gun makers and the gun owners?
The scope-of-employment doctrine viewed this way seems sensible
enough. This is not to say, however, that vicarious liability beyond the
scope of employment would never make sense. For example, if there
are efficient care-level investments that the employer can easily make
that would reduce the probability or severity of the harm to third
parties caused by their employees outside of the scope of employment,
and if transaction costs would prevent the parties from bargaining to
this result on their own, then assigning liability for the worker's be
yond-the-scope-of-employment harm to the employer might be effi
cient. It is standard to assume that the cheapest-cost harm avoider is
one of the parties who caused the harm in the traditional sense of the
concept of causation, but that need not necessarily be the case. Put
differently, even if the disappearance of the employer and the employ
ment relationship would not reduce the expected cost of the harm to
zero (which is another way of saying, even if the employer and the
employment relationship is not a "but for" cause of the third-party
harm), the employer conceivably could still be the cheapest-cost (or
next-cheapest-cost) harm avoider. It is at least possible that the em
ployer could take steps on its own to reduce the risk of third-party
harm-even if the activity in question is outside the scope of employ
ment. For example, the employer could condition some portion of the
workers' pay on their not causing any torts to third parties, for which
the employer will be liable.74
Such a liability regime, where employers are held liable for (some)
outside-the-scope-of-employment torts of their employees, could be
thought of as a type of compulsory employer-provided general liabil
ity insurance. Having employers' act as general liability insurers for
Torts, 9 J. Legal Stud. 463, 468 (1980) ("One action is a probabilistic cause of a conse
quence relative to another action if the probability of occurrence of the consequence is
higher given the first action than given the second.") (citations omitted); see also Omri
Ben-Shahar, Causation and Foreseeability, in 2 Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, note
2, at 644, 645 ("Under the normative economic analysis, the proximate cause doctrine's
designated role is to expand or shrink the scope of liability, in order to achieve efficient
deterrence.").
74 This idea is consistent with Calabresi's notion of assigning liability to the "best
briber." See Calabresi, note 9, at 150-52. Calabresi argues that if it is difficult to identify
the cheapest-cost avoider, it might be efficient to assign liability to the party best able to
identify the cheapest cost avoider and then to bribe them to make efficient investments in
accident avoidance. Id.
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their workers (and not merely as workplace liability insurers, as they
currently do) may not be efficient. But it might be. It is already the
case that employers voluntarily provide health insurance for costs in
curred by their employees that are unrelated to work, and some
policymakers and experts (though obviously not all) believe that this
is a sensible way of allocating health-care risks.75 A similar approach
to outside-of-employment liability risks, therefore, should not be dis
missed out of hand. Whether such a reform would in fact be a good
idea is, of course, an empirical question that would require further
investigation that is well beyond the scope of this Article.76
None of this is to say that deep-pocket vicarious liability, whether
limited to the scope of employment or not, will always be efficient. It
depends on the comparison of the overall social costs (including the
regulatory and administrative cost) of imposing and enforcing liability
on either the buyer or seller (employer or employee, gun user or gun
maker) or the cost of leaving the liability on the injured victims.
Moreover, in situations in which the worker is fully solvent, worker
liability is likely the most efficient outcome. That is, sometimes the
workers will have the deeper pockets. But if we assume that workers
are usually more likely to be judgment-proof and employers usually
have the deeper pockets, and we assume further that ex ante regula
tion of these sorts of risks is often extremely expensive, it seems likely
that vicarious deep-pocket liability will often make sense, especially
(as mentioned) in situations in which there are reasons to believe that
the deep pocket also happens to be the least (or a relatively cheap)
75 Thus, not only do employers remit premiums to purchase insurance that covers the
risks associated with workplace injuries to their employees (that is, workers' compensation
insurance), they also remit premiums to cover their employees' health-related risks that
have little or nothing to do with the workplace. We cannot infer from the existence of this
practice that it is necessarily efficient. After all, employer-provided health insurance has
long been subsidized through the federal income tax laws. See IRC § § 105, 106. Still, that
such a subsidy has been left in place for so many years suggests that policymakers must
believe that the subsidy has had some beneficial effects.
76 This argument suggests an immediate and obvious Coasean counter-argument: If the
market does not already allocate these risks in this way (that is, employers do not already
tend to provide their employees with general liability insurance as a fringe benefit), then
why should the law require it? The failure of the market to provide such a benefit, in other
words, could be seen as evidence of its efficiency. The problem with that argument, of
course, is that it ignores the incentives-discussed immediately below-that employers and
their workers have to structure their contractual arrangements so as to externalize such
liability costs onto third parties. That is, even though it might be efficient in some situa
tions to assign liability for outside-of-employment, worker-caused third-party harms to the
employer, we should expect Coasean bargaining between employers and employees to
push in the direction of assigning those liabilities to employees, who can benefit from their
relatively greater chance of being judgment-proof when the time to comes to pay the piper.
Such an arrangement could be joint wealth maximizing for employer and worker although
socially wasteful.
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cost harm avoider, as will often be the case in employer/employee re
lationships-even if not in the gun maker/gun user case. In other situ
ations, the balance of costs may cut in the other direction, or there
may even be situations in which the employers rather than employees
happen to be the judgment-proof parties, in which case the efficient
result may then be employee rather than employer liability.77 We
make an analogous point below with respect to tax remittance
obligations.78
It is also worth emphasizing that when and how to impose vicarious
liability are complex questions that often present difficult line-drawing
problems. For example, under respondeat superior, a principal is vi
cariously liable for the torts of its agent only if the principal had the
power to control the manner in which the agent did his job and only if
the agent commits the tort within the scope of the agency relationship.
In the employment context, these requirements are manifest in the
common law distinction between "employees," who are subject to the
control of the employer in how they do their work, and "independent
contractors," who in theory are not.79 Thus, an employer can be held
vicariously liable for the torts of its employees but not of independent
contractors who have been hired to do a job. On its face this distinc
tion is consistent with notions of efficient deterrence and least-cost
harm avoider, in that the employer will only be liable if it is in a posi
tion to control the worker's behavior. As soon as this sort of line is
drawn, however, employers have an incentive to manipulate it, by hir
ing independent contractors to do the work that otherwise (in the ab
sence of this line in the doctrine) would have been done by employees
or simply to characterize employees as contractors by ceding real or
apparent control to the workers. Either strategy could limit the em
ployer's liability. In addition, because of this distinction in tort law
between employees and independent contractors, employers have an
incentive to hire contractors who are judgment-proof, which enables
Kornhauser, note 56.
See discussion in Section IV.C.
79 The definition of an employee for tort law and tax law purposes relies on the same
multifactor common law test, which is designed to get at the question of control. See, e.g.,
Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296:
An individual is an employee for federal employment tax purposes if the
individual has the status of an employee under the usual common law rules
. . . . [T]he relationship of employer and employee exists when the [employer
has] the right to control and direct the [worker], not only as to the result to be
accomplished by the work but also as to the details and means by which that
result is accomplished. That is, an employee is subject to the will and control
of the employer not only as to what work has to be done but also as to how it
shall be done. In this connection, it is not necessary that the employer actually
direct or control the manner in which the services are performed; it is sufficient
if the employer has the right to do so.
77
78
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the contractors to avoid liability and essentially allows the contracting
parties-buyers and sellers-to externalize the third-party harm.80
There are, to be sure, potential solutions to this problem. For exam
ple, in situations in which workers have caused injuries to third par
ties, courts, instead of relying on the manipulable distinction between
employees and contractors, could simply hold the employers liable
any time the employee is insolvent and the employer is both solvent
and at least the next-least-cost harm avoider. Of course, if the em
ployee is expected to be solvent, then a rule that holds the employee
liable can make sense as well. s1
It should also be noted that ex ante regulation and vicarious deep
pocket liability are not the only possible solutions to the judgment
proof problem. For example, some have suggested the possibility of
making the judgment-proof party purchase liability insurance that
fully covers the potential liability.82 For some situations this might be
a plausible solution. For example, every state requires drivers either
to purchase liability insurance or otherwise to demonstrate their "fi
nancial responsibility" before they are allowed to register their auto
mobile.83 On the other hand, for other situations, compulsory liability
insurance is impractical. And even in contexts where compulsory in
surance is a realistic possibility, whether in general it will be efficient
overall would depend on how the overall per unit cost of compulsory
liability insurance (including the cost of administering such a system)
would compare with the alternative costs of c, c', and c".
A key lesson that emerges from this analysis is that in these settings
Coasean bargaining will not always be welfare-enhancing and that
sometimes it will be socially optimal to make legal entitlements or
obligations nontransferable. Why so? Imagine that assigning liability
for third-party harms to employers rather than to employees mini
mized overall social costs (harm plus administrative cost) because em
ployees are utterly judgment-proof and the next best alternative, ex
ante regulation, is exorbitantly costly. In that situation, if we assigned
80 Jennifer H. Arlen & W. Bentley MacLeod, Beyond Master-Servant: A Critique of
Vicarious Liability, in Exploring Tort Law 111, 1 15 (M. Stuart Madden ed., 2005). Of
course, if third parties are aware of this potential extemality, they might be less willing to
do business with the employer. Thus, there is a way in which the market could induce the
employer either to hire only employees or only contractors who are demonstrably solvent
or who have liability insurance. This is probably why, for example, building contractors
often advertise that their workers are "fully insured" or "fully bonded;" that is, so that
potential customers will not be dissuaded by the fear of suffering an unrecoverable harm.
81 Arlen and MacLeod make a similar argument. Id. at 122.
82 In the absence of such a requirement, judgment-proof parties will have an incentive to
purchase only enough liability insurance necessary to cover their assets that are subject to
liability. Shaven, note 32, at 193.
83 See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4509.101 (LexisNexis 2010).
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the liability to the employers but we allowed the obligation to be trans
ferable, competition would induce the employers, through Coasean
bargaining, to shift the burden contractually to employees. Employers
would initially save money by shedding the liability, and employees
would be willing to accept this liability, knowing that they were judg
ment-proof. This general process might be thought of as a form of
intentional or strategic judgment-proofing. It may be socially ineffi
cient because shifting the liability (that is, the remittance obligation)
increases the enforcement costs, by which we mean the social costs
attendant to noncompliance. Such costs, which are borne directly by
tax law enforcers, are not internalized by either the employer or the
employee.
How likely is this sort of intentional judgment-proofing in the real
world? We are not aware of any systematic empirical studies of this
question; however, the torts and the bankruptcy literatures both seem
to assume that the problem is a real one. Some scholars have noted
that there are substantial real-world incentives for parties intention
ally to judgment-proof themselves in order to externalize the costs of
potential tort harms onto third parties.84 For example, a number of
scholars have noted the externality that arises when corporate defend
ants become judgment-proof because of the doctrine of limited share
holder liability, which provides that a corporate shareholder's liability
for the debts of the corporation cannot exceed that shareholder's eq
uity investment in the corporation.85 Moreover, some scholars have
even observed that corporations have an incentive to strategically
render themselves judgment-proof against large tort claims by shifting
their most dangerous (or highest potential liability) activities into in
adequately capitalized subsidiaries or brother-sister corporations.86 In
addition, corporate tort defendants may adopt the strategy of borrow
ing against their assets and giving the lenders security interests in
84 See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Li
ability for Corporate Torts, 100 Yale L.J. 1879, 1881 (1991).
85 See, e.g., id. at 1881-83.
86 See generally Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 Yale L.J. 1 (1996); Lynn
M. LoPucki, The Essential Structure of Judgment-Proofing, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 147 (1998)
[hereinafter Essential Structure]. LoPucki contends that corporations have a strong incen
tive to (and in fact do) bifurcate their businesses into "operating entities," which will face
potential tort liabilities, and "asset-owning entities," which will not-thereby effectively
rendering the business judgment-proof. LoPucki, Essential Structure, supra, at 147. But
see James J. White, Corporate Judgment-Proofing: A Response to Lynn LoPucki's The
Death of Liability, 107 Yale L.J. 1363 (1998) (arguing that LoPucki overstates the problem
of corporate judgment-proofing); Yair Listokin, Is Secured Debt Used to Redistribute
Value from Tort Claimants in Bankruptcy? An Empirical Analysis, 57 Duke L.J. 1037
(2008) (finding that firms with relatively large potential tort liabilities do not reveal a
greater propensity to use secured debt, suggesting that the motive to "redistribute" from
tort plaintiffs to secured creditors plays little role).
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those assets, which secured interests come before tort claimants in pri
ority in the event of bankruptcy, thus increasing the chances that the
tort victims will go uncompensated. Potential solutions for this sort of
intentional judgment-proofing include a range of policy proposals, in
cluding: imposing liability on shareholders87 (or, as some have sug
gested, on lenders as well88), giving tort claimants a higher priority in
bankruptcy proceedings,89 requiring corporations to purchase liability
insurance,90 or even increasing the use of direct ex ante regulation by
government agencies.
The more general point is that Coasean bargaining can lead to out
comes that are privately joint-wealth maximizing but inefficient for
society overall. This problem will arise, among other places, when
parties are allowed to shift a tort liability to the party with respect to
whom, for whatever reason (including judgment-proofness), enforcing
the ex post liability would be most socially costly.91 As we discuss
below, there is an analogous set of problems in the tax context. That
is, although the conventional wisdom among economists is that the
assignment of tax remittance responsibility is irrelevant to efficiency
and distributive outcomes, we show that, once enforcement and com
pliance costs are taken into account, those invariance conclusions may
not obtain. We begin by presenting the conventional wisdom concern
ing the tax invariance results mentioned in the introduction.
D.

From Torts to Tax

Before proceeding further to the tax analogy, we need to emphasize
the fundamental differences between the tort and tax liabilities. In
the tort scenario that we have focused on, private actions undertaken
in the context of contractual relationships inflict harm or the risk of
harm on other private parties. (There are of course many other tort
settings that do not involve contractual relationships, but they are less
relevant to the tax comparison.) The efficiency motivations for impos
ing tort liability in such a case are well known in the torts literature:
to ensure that the right amount of the private activity is undertaken
and also that the right amount of harm-reducing steps is taken (the
activity-level and care-level effects mentioned above.) We might
think of the costs incurred by parties to reduce the actual risks of
87

E.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, note 84.
E.g., David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 Colum. L.
Rev. 1565, 1641 (1991).
89 Id. at 1643.
90 Hansmann & Kraakman, note 84, at 1927-28.
91 Below we discuss what changes when it is not socially optimal to completely enforce
the liability. See discussion in Section IV.D.
88
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harm to others as tort "compliance costs," which are analogous to the
costs incurred by taxpayers to comply with the tax laws. Once a tort
liability regime is in place, however, private parties may also take
steps (other than activity-level and care-level changes) to reduce their
effective liability for a given harm. For example, they might attempt
to judgment-proof themselves. Or they might even attempt to "cover
up" their tort, by taking steps to make it difficult to trace the causal
connection between the product and the harm.92 We might think of
these costs as being akin to "evasion" on the tax side. Therefore, en
forcing the tort liability itself generates costs-the costs of running the
court system and establishing causation and liability-that we call
"administrative costs." To distinguish these issues, we have intro
duced the semantic distinction between the least-cost harm avoider
(the party who can most efficiently reduce the harm or risk of harm by
either care-level or activity-level changes, or both) and the least-cost
liability avoider (the party who can most efficiently minimize the lia
bility award, for a given amount of harm).
Contrast the above-described tort situation with the case of a tax.
First we need to distinguish two types of taxes: those designed to cor
rect externalities (sometimes called Pigouvian taxes) and those de
signed merely to raise revenue to spend on public goods. Pigouvian
taxes are used much like tort law, to internalize externalities. Thus, if
a given activity produces negative externalities, levying a tax on that
activity equal to the marginal external social cost can be efficiency
enhancing. Thus, the primary efficiency effect of a Pigouvian tax is
the activity-level effect mentioned above, as the tax moves the amount
of the externality-generating activity (down) toward its optimal level.
A Pigouvian tax, in theory, can also have efficiency-enhancing care
level effects, insofar as the tax can be adjusted ex post for the harm
reducing steps that are undertaken. Such ex post adjustments to
Pigouvian taxes, however, are rarely if ever actually made. The
Pigouvian tax reduces the private utility of the parties involved in the
market, but produces an offsetting social benefit to the extent the col
lected revenue is spent on public goods.
In the case of non-Pigouvian taxes, the tax is not imposed with the
objective of reducing the level of the taxed activity.93 Indeed, any re
duction in the amount of the taxed activity is an unintended, if una92 The tobacco industry did this for many years, producing their own research results
that supposedly disproved or undermined the link between smoking and various illnesses.
Wendy Koch & Kevin Johnson, Inside the Tobacco Wars Government Says Cover-Up
Lasted 45 Years, USA Today, Sept. 23, 1999, at lA.
93 A negative Pigouvian tax, or a Pigouvian subsidy, is designed to increase the level of
the activity. In general, then, Pigouvian taxes/subsidies aim to change the level of some
activity, pushing in the direction of optimality.
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voidable, negative consequence of a non-Pigouvian tax.94 Thus, an
optimal non-Pigouvian tax system seeks, other things equal, to mini
mize the cost of these behavioral consequences, known as distortions.
The only social benefit of such taxes arises from the uses to which the
tax revenue is put. Because the revenue has social value, it is gener
ally socially optimal for the government to expend resources to ensure
that tax liability is remitted. In drawing out the analogy between tort
and tax, we concentrate in what follows on non-Pigouvian taxes.
IV.
A.

CoAsE MEETS THE TRIPs

The Standard Tax Remittance Invariance Story: Zero
Compliance and Administrative Costs

We have argued that the Coase Theorem and the law-and-econom
ics literature on torts, including Calabresi's notion of identifying the
least-cost harm avoider, primarily address the problem of choosing
the optimal legal responsibility for some expected harm. The problem
to which we now turn, which is identical in some ways to the Coasean
and Calabresian questions but different in others, is the problem of
choosing the optimal assignment of the legal obligation to remit a
given tax liability to the government.
The standard view among economists is that the assignment of the
tax remittance obligation has no effect on the incidence of the tax in
question. This is the TRIPI notion, and something like it (though
without the catchy acronym) can be found in every modern public
finance text.95 The assumptions that underlie the TRIPI assertion typ
ically are left implicit, but the basic story goes something like this: As
above, it is standard to assume a competitive market setting-many
small sellers and buyers, free entry and exit, no externalities, perfect
information, long-run equilibrium price and quantity. The setting is
often a tax triggered by sales of either commodities or labor. For sim
plicity, we assume, as does the literature, that the taxes are assessed
on a per-unit basis, although a very similar sort of analysis, with essen
tially the same result, can be used for proportional taxes on value
(that is, so-called ad valorem taxes). It is also implicitly assumed in
these models that there are no administrative costs or compliance
costs (such as the costs of learning the tax laws, gathering the relevant
information, and filing the appropriate forms), or that the administra
tive plus compliance costs are exactly the same among all remitters.96
These are important assumptions that we relax below.
94

Other than a lump sum tax.
Gayer, note 13, at 309-10.

95 Rosen &
96 Id.
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Given all of these assumptions, the results follow immediately: No
matter who-seller or buyer-is assigned the legal responsibility for
remitting the tax to the government, the results will be the same. The
distributional consequences of the tax will depend not on the assign
ment of the remittance obligation, but on the relative supply and de
mand elasticities.97 This is exactly the same as in the Coasean
externality case above. In addition, the degree of inefficiency or dead
weight loss generated by the tax will depend not on the remittance
responsibility but on the relevant elasticities: the less elastic the sup
ply or demand for the good or service is, the smaller the deadweight
loss.98
We can illustrate our points with another stylized example, this one
taken straight from the pages of any public finance text.99 Starting
from Figure 2, which again represents the market for labor provided
by workers and purchased by employers, we see again that there is an
initial equilibrium price and quantity of labor sold and consumed.
Next Figure 5 depicts what happens when we introduce a per-unit tax
on labor earnings equal to t.
FIGURE 5
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This figure deals specifically with a per-unit tax of t that must be
remitted by the seller (here, the worker) . As is standard, the conse97
98
99

Id.
Id.
Id.
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quences of such a tax (and remittance obligation) can be shown by a
parallel shift upward in the supply curve, just as in Figure 2. Although
the remittance obligation is placed on workers (the suppliers of labor),
the economic burden of the tax will be shared by the suppliers and
consumers, through the changes in the prices they receive and pay,
respectively; and the sharing of this burden between suppliers and
consumers will depend on the relative supply and demand elasticities
for labor. Thus, the analysis of the sharing of the tax burden is identi
cal to the analysis of the sharing of the harm in Figure 2. The analysis
of the overall social cost created by the introduction of a tax, however,
is different from the Figure 2 analysis, for the simple reason that intro
ducing a new tax (other than a Pigouvian tax) is different from intro
ducing a new cost.100
The difference is straightforward: When the tax, t, is introduced, it
produces tax revenue, represented by the area IEGK, which, unlike
the same area in Figure 2, is not a deadweight loss to society, but
rather represents a transfer of purchasing power from private agents
to the government. In a baseline case where the social value of the tax
revenue per dollar is the same as the social value of a dollar of for
gone private surplus, the social (or deadweight) loss is the difference
between the decline in consumer and producer surplus, IEBGK, and
the increase in tax revenue, IEGK; this difference is equal to the clas
sic Harberger triangle representation of deadweight loss, the area
EBG. This social cost arises because the tax imposes a "wedge" be
tween the price paid by employers and the price received by workers,
causing labor output to fall. The area EBG represents the social cost
of the distortion of output from x0 to x1 ; the vertical distance between
the S curve and the D curve represents the social cost of each margi
nal unit of the forgone output, which is the difference between the
value to the consumer and the value of the resources needed to pro
duce it.
And now for the tax invariance result. Figure 6 shows the effects of
a unit tax of t on wages in the case where the employer must remit.
As in the comparison between Figure 2 and 3, everything is exactly
the same as between Figure 5 and 6: the wage paid by the employer
and the wage received by the worker, the change in employer and
worker surplus, the change in output, the tax revenue collected, and
the deadweight loss. Thus, not only is the allocation of the burden
between employers and workers invariant (which we have called
100 We can imagine that the new cost assigned in Figures 2 and 3 are actually per-unit
Pigouvian taxes designed to internalize some external cost that is created by the produc
tion or use of widgets. The effect on prices and quantities would be the same, but the
effect on social cost would have to reflect the social cost engendered by the externality.
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TRIPI), but also there is exactly the same degree of inefficiency (or
deadweight loss) produced by either remittance assignment (TRIPE).
Again, this is the standard tax invariance explanation that is conven
tional wisdom among tax economists.101
B.

Compliance Costs

As was the case with the invariance conclusions above in our con
tractual version of the Coase Theorem, a key implicit assumption of
the standard demonstrations of these tax invariance propositions is
that there are no administrative or compliance costs generated in the
tax collection process, where administrative costs are again defined as
those borne in the first instance by the government (but ultimately
borne by individual taxpayers) and compliance costs are defined as
those borne in the first instance by private parties (though these too
may be shifted to parties other than those who remit the compliance
costs). In the real world, of course, just as a tort system, or any other
regulatory system, generates administrative and compliance costs, so
too do tax systems.
To expand our analysis to deal with these realities, we begin by as
suming that taxpayers do indeed have to incur compliance costs to
satisfy their tax obligations. They have to learn the relevant tax laws
101 Slemrod addresses the situations under which TRIPI and TRIPE fail, without ad
dressing the analogy to Coase, Calabresi, and torts. Slemrod, note 16.
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and regulations, gather financial information that bears on their tax
remittance obligations, file forms of various sorts, calculate the appro
priate amount of tax and then remit it to the government; or they have
to pay someone to do all those things for them. Moreover, we assume
initially that, as between employers and employees, compliance costs
are exactly the same. Specifically, we assume that whichever party is
assigned the remittance burden will have to incur a per-unit compli
ance cost of c, and the other nonremitting party will not have to incur
any compliance costs. For simplicity, we assume that this compliance
cost is a constant proportion of the amount of the good or service
being produced in the transaction that triggers the tax. Thus, for
every additional unit of labor sold and purchased in our example, the
compliance cost goes up a proportional amount. These assumptions
are entirely analogous to the assumptions in the previous Part discuss
ing tort liability. We put administrative costs aside for now. Given all
of these assumptions, Figure 7 shows how to analyze compliance costs,
when the per-unit tax of t is remitted by the supplier, who also directly
shoulders the per-unit compliance cost of c.
The total deadweight loss to society is represented by the difference
between the decline in consumer plus producer surplus, VUBNR, and
the tax revenue collected, SMNR, which is equal to VUMS plus UBN.
VUMS is the compliance cost and UBN is the social cost of distorting
production/consumption from x0 to x2•
Figure 8 shows that the effect would be no different if the remit
tance obligation were placed on the employer, which, again, would
produce the same per-unit level of compliance cost.
The point is analogous to the point that we analyzed in the compari
son between Figures 2 and 3: The remittance obligation (and thus the
identity of the party who directly incurs the compliance costs) is in
equilibrium immaterial to the impact of these costs on the welfare of
both parties and the allocation of resources.
Now we introduce the possibility of asymmetric compliance costs,
where one class of parties (buyers or sellers, employers or employees)
has lower compliance costs than the other. When might this be?
Economies of scale to learning the tax laws, to gathering the relevant
tax information, and to filing forms with the tax authorities, would
suggest that bigger is better: Larger taxpayers would present lower
compliance costs per unit of tax remitted and collected. For example,
it seems likely that it would be cheaper to have the one employer
(especially if it is a large employer) file the relevant forms and transfer
the appropriate funds to the government rather than have dozens,
hundreds, or thousands of employees do so separately.
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The same argument could be made about the sales tax: We would
expect, in general, that large retail sellers would be the least-cost re
mitters of the tax on a given sale as compared with relatively small
consumers. These conclusions are analogous to the assumptions
sometimes made in tort law to justify respondeat superior liability of
employers for employee torts: The employer can reduce the harm at a
cost both less than the reduction in expected accident costs and less
than the compliance cost of the employees. Recall that this was part
of the argument for deep-pocket vicarious liability above.102 Now we
make a similar, and to our minds equally plausible, argument in the
context of tax remittance. How would this fit with our model? Does
it alter the standard tax invariance results that are so commonly
demonstrated in public finance textbooks?
It depends. Are we in a Coasean world-with zero transaction
costs and freely transferable entitlements and obligations-or are we
not? If transaction costs between buyers and sellers (employers and
employees) are zero, and if the parties are allowed to reallocate the
remittance obligation between them as they see fit, the parties will
shift the remittance obligation to the least-cost remitter (here the
party with the lower compliance costs), and, ignoring administrative

102

See discussion in Section 111.C.
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and enforcement issues, social welfare will be maximized.103 If, how
ever, transaction costs prevent such efficient shifting of remittance re
sponsibility, then overall social welfare will be maximized only by
imposing the remittance obligation on the least-cost remitter.104 Note
also that, in terms of distribution, with either result (the efficient as
signment of remittance responsibility to the least-cost remitter or the
inefficient assignment to the other party) the distribution of utility be
tween employers and employees will be determined by the relative
elasticities of supply and demand.
C.

Asymmetric Administrative Costs: Judgment-Proof, Dishonest,
or Otherwise Hard-to-Reach Taxpayers

At this point we introduce the possibility that alternative tax remit
tance obligations will produce asymmetric tax administrative costs as
between buyers and sellers-in our continuing example, as between
employers and employees. With respect to a tax on wages, for exam
ple, if it could be shown that the costs to the government of adminis
tering (that is, enforcing) an employer-based tax remittance obligation
are lower than the cost of administering an employee-based remit103 An example is the remittance by the lender rather than homeowner for property
taxes. This may be related to which party loses in the event of foreclosure. See Slemrod,
note 16, at 255.
104 See Craswell, note 18.
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tance obligation, that would be an independent justification for plac
ing the remittance responsibility on employers-independent of the
compliance-cost argument.105 And the same could be said of a retail
sales tax, assuming that the tax remittance obligations of sellers are
cheaper to enforce than the tax remittance obligations of buyers.
What might be the source of such differential administrative costs?
In the torts context, we focused on insolvency or judgment-proofness
as the source of differential administrative expense, because internal
izing costs to a judgment-proof party may require costly ex ante regu
lation or compulsory liability insurance. Judgment-proofness is
relevant in the tax context as well, although it is somewhat less of a
problem both because of the nature of tax liabilities (which arise more
slowly and predictably than do tort liabilities) and because of the spe
cial privileges typically afforded the tax collector in bankruptcy.106
Still, some individual taxpayers, especially taxpayers who live from
paycheck to paycheck, may have relatively few resources with which
to pay a large tax judgment. Indeed, one justification commonly given
for the current remittance regime for employment taxes in the United
States is precisely this concern about judgment-proofness. As one
well-known commentator put it, "Without a pay-as-you-earn system
making the employer a 'deputy tax collector,' it would be difficult if
not impossible to collect taxes from employees who spend their wages
as fast as they are received."107 Likewise, corporate taxpayers are vul
nerable to bankruptcy, which can leave them with little money with
which to pay their tax liabilities. In any event, if the tax remittance
obligation is assigned to a party who ends up being insolvent, the tax
is obviously less likely to be collected than otherwise absent the expen
diture of additional administrative resources.
The possibility of an insolvent tax remitter is not the only potential
source of asymmetric administrative costs. It could also be argued
that it is inherently cheaper (per dollar of revenue raised) for the tax
authority to police large taxpayers, because of the economics of scale
in tax enforcement. It is cheaper, for example, for the government to
audit a single large employer than to audit all of the employers' em
ployees separately. In addition, corporate taxpayers may have more
105 For now we continue to assume that the government expends whatever resources are
necessary to collect the entire legal tax obligation.
I06 For example, with U.S. federal taxes (income, gift, or estate), the U.S. government
automatically receives a lien against all the assets of a taxpayer if the taxpayer does not pay
the taxes upon "demand." IRC § 6321. Such tax liens automatically take priority over the
taxpayer's own claim to the property and, shortly thereafter, over all other creditors other
than secured creditors whose interests were perfected earlier. 11 U.S.C. §§ 506-507.
107 Boris I. Bittker & Lawrence Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates & Gifts
'11 111.5.2 (2005) (quoting McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. United States, 623 F.2d 700 (Ct. Cl. 1980)).
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financially at stake in their reputations and may therefore be less will
ing to risk being found guilty of tax evasion.108 If that is true, the per
dollar cost of administering an income tax system in which the remit
tance obligation is placed on large employers would be lower than the
per-dollar cost of a system that placed the obligation on employees.
The same argument could be made with respect to sales taxes. That is,
imposing the sales tax remittance obligation on large retail sellers to
remit is almost certainly less costly administratively than asking each
retail purchaser to remit the tax. We acknowledge, of course, that
large corporations also have agency problems; and sometimes corpo
rate management may be more willing to engage in tax fraud than
even the corporations' shareholders would prefer. On the other hand,
the more employees that are involved, the more difficult it is to main
tain a pattern of outright tax evasion, as the possibility of detection
rises with the number of potential whistleblowers.
What these arguments suggest is that, in situations in which the poli
cymaker is choosing who between two contractually connected parties
should bear the tax remittance responsibility for the tax triggered by
the parties' interaction, the best way to achieve the policymaker's in
tended combination of tax revenue and distributive burdens (at lowest
cost) is to impose the remittance obligation on the larger, wealthier
party-the one most likely to have assets with which to pay the tax
and the one whose tax compliance will be cheapest (per dollar of tax
collected) to ensure (that is, the one who, if given the remittance obli
gation, will give rise to the lowest administrative costs of tax enforce
ment). Notice that this administrative cost argument cuts in the same
direction as the least-cost remitter argument, which also points in the
direction of giving the remittance obligation to the larger, wealthier
party-the one who could benefit from economies of scale with re
spect to tax compliance costs. This convergence is similar to the con
vergence of arguments, discussed above, in favor of vicarious tort
liability, as both least-cost harm avoider and administrative/enforce
ment cost arguments favored respondeat superior liability under cer
tain assumptions. In sum, just as deep-pocket tort liability can be
justified in the tort context on efficiency grounds, it can also be justi
fied in the tax context on similar grounds.
Of course, size is not everything. There may be situations in which,
irrespective of the relative size or wealth of the parties to a given
transaction, one or the other is more likely to be beyond the reach of
the tax authority (which we can think of as giving rise to very high
administrative costs). This will be a problem when one of the parties
ms See Joel Slemrod, The Economics of Corporate Tax Selfishness, 57 Nat'!. Tax J. 877
(2004).
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is either outside of the taxing jurisdiction or is readily able to leave the
jurisdiction. For example, imagine a taxable transaction in which the
payer is within the taxing jurisdiction and the payee is outside the tax
ing jurisdiction. If the tax authority does not require the payer to
withhold and remit tax on the payment, there may be no other oppor
tunity to collect the tax, as the payee will be effectively judgment
proof-even if the payee has more overall assets than the payer. This
issue can obviously arise in the international context, where payments
are made by U.S. taxpayers to foreign individuals or entities, or in the
domestic U.S. context, where state taxing authorities are trying to col
lect taxes on interstate transactions. Some might argue that in such a
situation the best (or fairest) approach would be to find a way to have
the payee remit the tax. Our point is that, even if that were possible
(and we are assuming for the moment that it is), the incidence would
be the same whether the payer or payee remits, and the administrative
cost of enforcing a domestic payer remittance obligation will likely be
much lower.
We should also note another analogy between the tax and tort re
mittance questions. In the tort context, we noted that it will not al
ways be socially efficient to allow the parties to transfer the
remittance obligation contractually between them; recall the discus
sion of strategic judgment-proofing.109 A similar argument would ap
ply in the tax context. Once we allow for such differential
administrative costs, whether because of the economies of scale, the
judgment-proof problem, the foreign or missing taxpayer problem, or
because of differences in inherent willingness to evade taxes, then al
lowing the remittance responsibility to be transferable does not auto
matically lead to the socially efficient outcome because a transfer of
remittance responsibility may reduce the sum of compliance costs but
increase administrative costs by more than the compliance cost sav
ings. In terms of the figures, an important difference between the
analysis of Figure 4 and that of Figure 7 arises if the identity of the tax
remitter affects the administrative cost of the tax collected. In this
case the social cost of ILMS plus LBN shown in Figure 7 misses one
component of the social cost. It is possible that moving to the low
cost remitter, where cost is measured in terms of compliance costs and
distortion alone, might not represent the minimum social-cost remit
ter, if the former facilitates tax evasion or, in other words, makes tax
enforcement more costly. The overall efficient tax remittance ar
rangement should minimize the sum of three cost elements: distortion
cost, compliance cost, and administrative cost.
109

See discussion in Section 111.C.
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Optimal Evasion and Taxpayer Heterogeneity

So far we have implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) assumed that
compliance costs and, in particular, administrative costs may have to
be incurred to achieve compliance with the tax laws, but that, once
these costs are incurred, complete compliance is achieved. In that
context, we noted that the TRIPs do not hold, so long as there are
asymmetric compliance or administrative costs as between the parties
to the transaction that triggers the tax. What changes in our analysis if
we recognize the fact that, despite optimal investments to ensure com
pliance, there will nevertheless be some successful evasion? Put dif
ferently, how does the analysis change if full compliance with the tax
law is not a certainty? This may be because it is impossible to achieve
full compliance. Or it may be because it is not worth the cost; that is,
because of the nature of the social welfare function, there may-in
deed, will almost certainly be-a point at which the cost of achieving
marginally improved compliance exceeds the marginal benefit. In
such a case, what is the effect on TRIPs? What does it mean for the
optimal allocation of tax remittance responsibility?
As we argue in this Section, the tax invariance propositions still do
not hold. What is more, to the extent residual noncompliance is dis
tributed heterogeneously across the population of taxed parties, it
turns out that (ignoring how the tax dollars are spent) the introduction
of a non-Pigouvian tax may actually improve the welfare of the
noncompliant parties while decreasing the welfare of the compliant
parties. A similar point can be made with respect to heterogeneous
tort compliance.
Before we get to that result, though, notice that if tax compliance is
uncertain, the effect of a tax on equilibrium prices will depend on the
expectations each side-buyer and seller-has about their eventual
tax liability and on any attendant cost associated with (successful or
unsuccessful) noncompliance. In the standard model of optimal eva
sion, individuals will evade as long as the reduction in their expected
tax and penalty remittances exceeds the marginal private cost of the
evasion, where private cost includes the costs to the tax remitters of
disguising their behavior to the tax collector as well as the cost of re
mitters' increased risk-bearing owing to the uncertainty in after-tax
income that the evasion creates. Because (it is assumed that) the mar
ginal private costs are increasing with additional investments in eva
sion, whereas the marginal private gain is not, eventually the marginal
private gain from evasion will fall short of the marginal private cost.
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Because of the costs incurred, the net private gain will be less than the
expected tax saving. no
Governments have access to a number of policy actions that can
reduce evasion, but it generally is not socially optimal to eliminate
evasion completely, just as it is not optimal to expend the resources
necessary to eliminate all torts or to expunge all robbery. This is true
even when one enforcement tool is the financial penalty for detected
evasion, which is not a social cost, because very high penalties may
have consequences that are socially costly. This conclusion has impor
tant consequences for our analysis. To see this, imagine that the re
mittance responsibility for a given tax is switched from one party from
whom collection would be inexpensive (in terms of compliance and
administrative costs), so inexpensive such that full compliance is so
cially optimal, to another from whom collection would be expensive.
The optimal policy response in general would not be to maintain full
compliance and incur the now-considerable administrative costs of so
doing. Rather the optimal policy responses would be a combination
of somewhat higher administrative expenditure plus allowing a lower
level of compliance. This lower level of compliance entails social
costs, including higher risk-bearing costs and perhaps the need to raise
somewhat (not necessarily equal) more revenue in some other (costly)
way. Thus, once the idea of socially optimal evasion is recognized, the
increase in administrative costs does not accurately measure the in
crease in social costs from moving to an inferior remittance regime.
Now recognize that the inclination and opportunity to evade suc
cessfully is heterogeneous-not only as between buyers and sellers (as
we have already discussed) but within the class of buyers and within
the class of sellers.111 From an ex ante perspective, people (including
those people who make decisions for firms) differ both in their intrin
sic honesty and in their available opportunities for evasion.112 From
an ex post perspective, some acts of evasion are detected by enforce
ment systems, while others are not; of those acts that are detected, the
no Because of the penalty revenues collected on detected evasion, the private cost ex
ceeds the social cost.
111 Medema and Zerbe make a separate observation about the impact of heterogeneity:
that when people have heterogeneous utility functions, the assignment of property rights
can affect allocation because it changes aggregate demand functions. and therefore equilib
rium production. Medema & Zerbe, note 2, at 846-47. For example, if the injurers have a
higher wealth elasticity of demand for chili peppers than the injured. assigning the property
rights to the injurers will increase the aggregate demand for chili peppers, and therefore
their price, unless all goods are produced at constant cost (and therefore equilibrium prices
are always unaffected by demand conditions).
112 To the extent that heterogeneous evasion opportunities apply to categories of em
ployer and employee, there will be market adjustments in the remuneration of that activ
ity; the following examples therefore apply to heterogeneity not associated with such
categories. See the example of housepainters below.

Imaged with the Permission ofN.Y.U Tax Law Review

842

TAX LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:

penalties may differ. Although it is the aggregate response to a tax
rate change that will determine how much a given tax rate change
affects the consumer and producer prices, respectively, the effect on
any one person or firm will depend on the price change and on their
own exposure to the price, which now depends on their evasion be
havior-which again turns on their ex ante characteristics and their ex
post results-as well as their (other) preferences and technology.
To see the implications for the TRIPs of these more realistic as
sumptions, consider a tax on the income from house painting. As
sume that the remittance obligation is placed on the painter rather
than the paintee and that half of housepainters are scrupulously hon
est while the other half are scrupulously dishonest. Assume further
that there is no private cost incurred to effect the evasion, that the
probability of detection is zero, and, of course, that all parties are fully
informed of all of these facts. What happens when the tax is intro
duced? The supply curve shifts up by only one-half of the tax rate,
since only the one-half of the painters actually will remit the taxes
they owe will require a higher pretax payment to elicit the same work.
The impact on equilibrium prices as always depends on the relative
supply and demand elasticities, here for house painting services. For
the sake of simplicity, say that the supply and demand elasticities are
equal (and not affected by the evasion possibilities).113 In this case
the price to consumers rises by exactly one-forth of the tax: one-half
of the one-half-of-the-tax upward shift in the supply curve. As long as
the price received by noncompliant painters is the same as the price
paid by consumer (that is, there is no tax wedge), the price they each
receive goes up by this same amount. As a result, the noncompliant
painters are better off because of this tax. In contrast, the price re
ceived by honest housepainters falls by three-quarters of the tax (that
is, the full tax remitted offset by a price increase of one-forth of the
tax). An identical result could be reached if the heterogeneity was not
with respect to inherent honesty, but judgment-proofness; for exam
ple, if we assumed that half were judgment-proof, half were not, and
detection was a certainty.
Consider now a slightly different example involving a more general
labor income tax. Specifically, imagine a labor income tax that is to be
remitted by employers, and assume that the pre- and post-tax wages
have adjusted to reflect this tax. With one exception: One small firm
does not remit the tax, and it costlessly and completely gets away with
it. (The firm's employees do not suspect, and are unaware of, the eva
sion). In this situation, the owners of the lone noncompliant firm are
better off because in the new equilibrium they incur the lower after11 3

See discussion in Section IV.E.
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tax wage rather than the pretax wage incurred by all other firms
Indeed, they are better off because of the imposition of the tax. This
occurs because the market adjustment in wages depends on the re
sponses of the preponderance of tax-complying firms, not on the be
havior of the relatively few (or single, in this example) noncompliant
firms. That is, as long as the noncompliant firms remain only a small
part of the market, they benefit from the decline in the after-tax wage
expected by their (assumed to be homogeneous) workers, but they do
not remit the tax that is the cause of that decline. We might say, then,
that this result follows from the heterogeneity of firms with respect to
their inclination and ability to evade taxes. If, alternatively, the remit
tance obligation were placed on employees instead of employers, then
the employer heterogeneity would not matter, and what would matter
is the heterogeneity of employees. Which side is given the obligation
to remit will not affect the relative burden on average as between em
ployers and employees, but will affect which particular parties (indi
viduals and firms) win and lose, and by how much. Thus, TRIPI is
violated in circumstances in which there is heterogeneity among tax
payers with respect to their willingness or ability to evade.
A similar analysis can be applied in the tort context. The best anal
ogy would be the one discussed above involving parties who intention
ally judgment-proof themselves against potential tort liabilities.114 A
firm or individual who knowingly engages in some activity that poses a
risk of third-party harm that exceeds the injurer's ability to reimburse
can be understood as a sort of tort liability evader. And the willing
ness and ability to engage in that sort of behavior is almost certainly
heterogeneously distributed across parties, even within industries. As
a result of this fact, of course, the naive Coasean prediction that the
assignment of liability should have no distributional consequences
does not hold. Moreover, this argument lends credence to the familiar
observation that the introduction of any tax or legal restriction actu
ally increases the utility of the noncompliant parties (vis a vis the
world without the tax or restriction), so long as there are enough com
pliant parties to cause an increase in the pretax price of the activity.
E.

Nonproportional Collection Costs

To this point we assumed that aggregate compliance costs are pro
portional to the aggregate quantity produced/consumed (that is, they
are a fixed per-unit constant), although we allowed the costs at any
aggregate output level to depend on what the remittance arrange
ments are. We hinted though at the likelihood that the magnitude and
11 4

See text accompanying notes 83-91.
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nature of these costs may depend on the micro details of the markets
involved. In this Section we pursue the implications of looking at the
micro-foundations of enforcement and compliance costs.
To fix ideas, consider a stylized world in which remittance-related
compliance costs are completely inframarginal, in the sense that the
per-period cost is unaffected by the extent of a participant's involve
ment (that is, how much they buy, or sell) in a taxed activity, but only
by the fact of participating in the market. In other words, there are
fixed, but no variable, costs of compliance. Let the remittance burden
be on firms. Some, presumably mostly small, firms will no longer be
profitable, and will drop out of the market. This means that the sup
ply curve shifts upward, and the new equilibrium price will be higher
depending on the relative supply and demand elasticities. But the
higher price is of greater value to bigger firms than to smaller firms
(because they sell more), so that the new equilibrium will have impli
cations for the distribution of firm sizes. Moreover, as above, these
consequences would differ if the remittance responsibility was placed
on consumers. In the latter case firm heterogeneity would be immate
rial, and consumer heterogeneity would affect the outcome.
Consider the consequences if the remittance responsibility was
placed on consumers, with a compliance cost triggered by participat
ing in the market but unrelated to the extent of participation. Some
consumers, presumably small ones, would be dissuaded from entering
the market, and so the demand curve would shift down. This would
cause a decline in the market price, depending on the relative supply
and demand elasticities, but the decline would not offset the utility
loss equally for small and large consumers; small consumers would be
relatively worse off, because the price decline is of relatively little im
portance compared to the fixed compliance cost.
When there is evasion, having the remittance responsibility can also
change the elasticity of response. For example, consider the conse
quences if the private cost of an employee evading a given amount of
labor income is lower when the true amount of labor income is
higher.115 This implies that the elasticity of labor supply with respect
to the pretax wage rate will be different from its elasticity with respect
to the tax rate. It also reduces the effective marginal tax rate on sup
plying labor, because of the "evasion-facilitating" character of labor
supply, and in general will alter both the height of the labor supply
curve and its elasticity. To the extent it affects the elasticity of labor
supply, the incidence of imposing any cost, including a compliance
cost, will change. If the elasticity of labor supply is larger (smaller)
115
&

Joel Slemrod, A General Model of the Behavioral Response to Taxation, 8 Int'! Tax
Pub. Fin. 119, 120-22 (2001).
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than otherwise, then any cost will shift away from (toward) labor
more than it otherwise would. If alternatively the employer had to
remit and had evasion possibilities, then it is labor demand that is po
tentially affected, with different consequences for the incidence of tax
liability or compliance cost. Only if the pretax wage elasticity and tax
rate elasticity of labor supply bear a particular symmetric relationship
with the pretax wage and tax rate elasticity of labor supply will the
remittance responsibility be irrelevant for the pretax and after-tax
wage rate.
F.

Equivalences

A transitivity property applies to the tax remittance invariance prin
ciples, TRIPI and TRIPE: If tax system A has identical consequences
as tax system B, and tax system B has identical consequences as tax
system C, then tax system A has identical consequences as tax system
C. Stringing together a series of transitivity relationships reveals
some well-known equivalences among tax systems with very different
remittance arrangements, where equivalence means identical inci
dence, allocation, and efficiency consequences. Consider the retail
sales tax. We already discussed that the tax triggered by retail sales
could, in principle, be remitted by the concumers or by the retail es
tablishments. In the latter case, which is the norm for all retail sales
taxes for reasons already discussed, there must be a mechanism to dis
tinguish business sales made to other businesses from business sales to
consumers; in U.S. states' retail sales taxes this is done by issuing busi
ness exemption certificates to business purchasers.116
Now recognize that, in the absence of enforcement concerns, the
combination of a tax that must be remitted by one party to a transac
tion and an equal credit offered to the other party is equivalent to
levying no net tax at all. Next observe that a value-added tax (VAT) is
equivalent to a tax triggered by retail sales plus offsetting taxes and
credits triggered by every business-to-business sale. Because each of
these offsetting tax-and-credit remittance obligations net to zero, the
VAT thus is-absent enforcement concerns-equivalent to a retail
sales tax, as all tax textbooks note.111
116

Abuse of such exemption certificates is a major enforcement concern.
See, e.g., Rosen & Gayer, note 13, at 486. To see this, imagine a highly stylized
economy consisting of two firms.
Example I: Firm A uses $30 of labor to produce its product, which it sells for
$40 to Firm B, making a $10 profit. Firm B uses Firm A's output as an input,
and hires $45 of labor to produce a product that it sells to consumers for $100,
making a $15 profit. A 10% retail sales tax would collect $10 from Firm B.
Under a VAT, the tax base is receipts minus purchases from other businesses.
Thus, a 10% VAT would collect $4 from Firm A and $6 from Firm B, for a
117
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What is the advantage of adding remittance obligations (and credit
entitlements) for nonretail businesses to a retail sales tax, as a VAT
does, and thereby in principle involving all businesses in the tax sys
tem? The answer lies in the administrative and enforcement implica
tions. Because of the difficulty of involving the multitude of
consumers in the tax system, a retail sales tax has no natural way to
check that the retailer has remitted the correct amount. But business
to-business sales allow for the possibility of such a check, in that the
credit of the purchasing business is contingent on an invoice provided
by the seller attesting to its remittance. Moreover, under a VAT the
identity of the purchaser (that is, whether it is a final consumer or a
business) is no longer relevant, so business exemption certificates (and
the evasion they induce and the enforcement they require) are not
needed. Thus, applying the framework of this Article, we might say
that, although the VAT and the retail sales tax are equivalent assum
ing equal administrative costs, once we acknowledge the relatively
high administrative costs that would be necessary to achieve
equivalent levels of compliance under the retail sales tax, the VAT is
overall superior. ns
total of $10. Starting from a retail sales tax, adding the business-to-business
transactions to the tax base adds $4 of tax liability on Firm A and a $4 credit
for Firm B, and thus an additional net tax liability of zero.
us The VAT, of course, has its own weaknesses in terms of enforceability. In recent
years a new VAT tax evasion scam, called "missing trader fraud" or "carousel fraud," has
spread across much of the VAT-using world, especially among EU countries, where goods
can be sold between countries without triggering any net tax. In its simplest form, the
scheme works this way: One party imports some good from another VAT country, free of
tax because of the zero rating of exports. Then the importer turns around and sells the
good to a domestic purchaser, charging a price that is somewhat higher than otherwise
because of the VAT that is owed on the purchase (that is, because most sales do result in
the VAT being paid). The seller then disappears without actually remitting the tax on the
sale. The domestic buyer, innocent and unaware of the fraud, may then file for a credit for
the tax that should have been remitted by the buyer, only to learn that the taxing authority
may be unwilling to give the credit for the tax that was not in fact remitted. See generally
Richard Pincher, The Cost of VAT Frauds: Bond House Systems Ltd and Optigen, 5 Brit.
Tax Rev. 346 (2003). The carousel concept arises when this arrangement is repeated, with
several parties buying and selling the same product, with (again) some (though not all) of
the parties involved simply disappearing without remitting any tax. The EU Tax Bar and
tax enforcers regard the carousel fraud problem as a serious threat to the viability of the
VAT as a reliable source of revenue, and some have even argued for experimenting with
the retail sales tax alternative. See Michael Keen & Stephen Smith, VAT Fraud and Eva
sion: What Do We Know and What Can Be Done?, 59 Nat'! Tax J. 861 (2006). What this
example makes clear is that identifying the lowest-overall-cost tax remitter (taking into
account administrative costs) is not always an easy task, may defy our easy intuitions, and
may even be a moving target. It also suggests the possibility of an expanded role for joint
and-several tax liability. In the carousel fraud example discussed above, this would mean
holding the innocent buyer liable secondarily for the tax by disallowing their credit if the
tax is not remitted by the buyer in the first instance. At least one court has decided, how
ever, that this result is inappropriate and that innocent third parties who are caught up in
the offending transaction should not be made to remit the tax. Joined Cases C-354/03, C-
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A VAT is turned into the Hall-Rabushka flat tax by adding one
more set of exactly offsetting tax obligations and credit entitlements
between firms and employees.119 Under the flat tax (but not under a
VAT), firms can deduct payments to workers (that is, credit taxes) and
the workers "owe " tax on their wages and salaries. If the business tax
and labor income tax rate are equal, this is equivalent to levying no
tax at all. In contrast to the switch from a retail sales tax to a VAT
under the usual remittance arrangements for each, though, the switch
from a VAT to a Hall-Rabushka flat tax need not entail any change in
remittance responsibility because firms could withhold and remit tax
to fulfill their workers' labor income tax obligations; thus the pattern
of remittances could be identical to a VAT. The motivation for intro
ducing these zero-net-tax obligations is that, by levying a tax on labor
income and requiring individuals to complete returns, the tax obliga
tion can be tailored to the individual worker's situation. In particular,
each worker can be allocated a fixed exemption of labor income.120
Thus, the motivation of moving from a VAT to a Hall-Rabushka flat
tax is to allow flexibility in implementing progressivity and not, as in
the case of moving from a retail sales tax to a VAT, to improve admin
istration and enforcement.
Introducing zero-net-tax remittance obligations and credit entitle
ments for administration and enforcement reasons is the same motiva
tion behind reverse withholding requirements.121 These obligations
and entitlements need not be triggered by exactly the same transac
tions as the underlying tax base; for example, in a VAT the value of
any single business-to-business sale, which triggers tax remittance ob355/03 & C-484/03, Optigen Ltd., Fulcrum Electronics Ltd. and Bond House Systems Ltd.
v. Comm'rs of Customs & Excise (2006), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62003J0354:EN:HTML. Our framework, however, would sug
gest that requiring the innocent third parties to remit the tax might come closer to approxi
mating the lawmakers' desired combination of efficiency and distributive outcomes. The
argument is comparable to the argument for expanding the wage withholding rules to
cover payments to independent contractors.
119 The flat tax proposal is laid out in Robert E. Hall & Alvin Rabushka, The Flat Tax
(1995). Under the tax, there is a business tax base and a personal tax base. The business
tax base is receipts minus payments to labor and purchases from other firms. Id. at 60-64.
The personal tax base is receipts of labor income. Id. at 58-60. Under the original Hall
Rabushka proposal, both bases are subject to an identical flat rate, and there is an exemp
tion for personal income that depends on marital status.
Example 2: In Example 1, under a 10% flat tax with no exemption, Firm A
would have a tax liability of $1, Firm B would have a tax liability of $1.50, and
there would be labor income tax due of $7.50 (that could be remitted by the
firms on behalf of the employees), for a total of $10.
120 In the X-tax championed by David Bradford, a graduated rate structure is applied to
labor income. David F. Bradford, What Are Consumption Taxes and Who Pays Them?, 39
Tax Notes 383, 383 (Apr. 18, 1988).
121 See discussion in Section V.D.
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ligations and credit entitlements, is not consumption. Indeed, any tax
system is defined by the totality of its remittance obligations (and
credit entitlements), any one of which need not be based on a well
known tax base such as aggregate consumption or production. For
example, a tax on aggregate consumption can be implemented by lev
ying tax on each act of consumption, or on each firm's value added,
knowing that (ignoring foreign trade) aggregate value added equals
aggregate consumption.
Now consider again the tort context. Imagine some harm arises out
of the production or consumption of a good or service. We have al
ready argued that, absent administrative and enforcement concerns,
the tort liability could be placed on the producing firms or the con
sumers with equivalent consequences. We now see that tort liability in
principle could be placed on any party doing business with either the
producing firms or the consumers (or, in the employment context, any
party doing business with either the employers or the employees) and,
furthermore, that the base of any particular liability need not be the
same as the harm-producing action. Pursuing the analogy with the
VAT, if final consumption produces harm, the tort "remittance" liabil
ity could be placed not only on the retail business and consumer, but
also on businesses throughout the production and distribution chain
that precedes the retail transaction.
For example, just as a VAT can produce the equivalent level of tax
revenue and distributional consequences as a retail sales tax, though
at lower administrative costs, so too imposing tort liability on the par
ties who are in the lower stages of the chain of production of some
product (that ultimately causes a third-party harm) can achieve
equivalent consequences to imposing the harm on the final seller
and may do so at relatively low administrative costs. This is indeed
one of the efficiency arguments for making strict products liability
joint-and-several with respect to retail sellers, wholesalers, and manu
facturers, including manufacturers of component parts.
G.

Qualifications

Our results depend on an assumption that all market participants
make decisions on the basis of tax-inclusive prices and are not affected
by the situational framing of the prices or by any other behavioral
phenomena, such as the endowment effect, that would introduce other
considerations into their decisions. If, for example, a worker per
ceives the same after-tax take-home pay of $600 per week differently
depending on whether the check comes after-tax or whether it comes
pretax and she must remit the tax, this could affect the amount of
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labor supplied at a given after-tax wage and our conclusions would
have to be modified.
Such behavioral phenomena could also have political economy im
plications, to the extent they affect taxpayer-voters' perception of the
cost of government programs. There is some evidence that tax sys
tems are designed to minimize the perceived burden of a given
amount of tax liability.1 22 The politics of income tax withholding in
the United States suggest that remittance matters, as many conserva
tives dislike withholding because it reduces the visibility of tax collec
tion and thus reduces the perceived cost of government. They prefer
that employees, not employers, remit taxes every week or every
month. Indeed, some legislators introduced into Congress a bill enti
tled the Cost of Government Awareness Act of 2001, which would
eliminate withholding and instead require individuals to remit income
taxes in monthly installments.123 Likewise, the version of the Hall
Rabushka flat tax introduced as a bill by then-House Majority Leader
Dick Armey eliminated employer withholding, which Armey referred
to as a "deceptive device that has made big government possible. " 1 24
The remittance rules may also matter in the transition from one tax
system to another. As an example, consider the consequences of abol
ishing a retail sales tax. If tax-inclusive prices were fixed in the short
run, eliminating the retailers' requirement to remit would provide a
windfall gain to their owners. If, alternatively, consumers had been
the remitting party, they would gain if the tax-inclusive price stayed
fixed. The transition gains and losses thus depend critically on the
short-run flexibility of prices.
V.
A.

APPLYING THE LEAST-COST-REMITTER IDEA

Current Law: Tax Withholding, Sales Tax Remittance, and
Gift Tax Liability

Our analysis provides an explanation for a number of aspects of
current tax law in the United States and other countries and suggests
some possible reforms. First, consider wage withholding for individ
ual income taxes. From the perspective of our framework, imposing
an obligation on the employer to withhold and remit taxes that are
based on the overall income status of its employees is akin to vicarious
employer tax liability. That is, except for the inherent distinctions al122 See Aradhna Krishna & Joel Slemrod, Behavioral Public Finance: Tax Design as
Price Presentation, 10 lnt'l Tax & Pub. Fin. 189 (2003).
1 23 Cost of Government Awareness Act of 2001, H.R. 1364, 107th Cong.
124 Dick Armey, Why America Needs the Flat Tax, in Fairness and Efficiency in the Flat
Tax 96, 99 (1996) ("Only by taking people's money before they ever see it has the govern
ment been able to raise taxes to their current height without sparking a revolt.").
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ready discussed between taxes and torts, wage withholding is similar
in important ways to vicarious employer liability for the harms caused
by employees. This analogy not only suggests a rationale for the cur
rent income tax withholding rules, but also provides an argument for a
reasonable expansion of those rules-along the lines of expanded em
ployer tort liability discussed above.
But first let us review the U.S. wage withholding rules in greater
detail. Under the U.S. tax system, both the employers and the em
ployees have remittance obligations with respect to the taxes owed on,
or triggered by, an employee's income. The Code, for example, im
poses on employers an obligation to "deduct and withhold" a given
percentage of the employee's wages as employment taxes, to hold
these funds in trust for Treasury (typically in a special account in a
bank that is qualified to accept tax remittances), and then eventually
to remit those funds to the government.125 Employment taxes include
Social Security and Medicare taxes, federal unemployment taxes, and
federal income taxes. With respect to the Social Security, Medicare,
and unemployment taxes, the amounts to be withheld are strictly pre
scribed by law.126 With respect to income tax withholding, although
the employee has some say as to the amount that is withheld (through
the filing of his Form W-4), the rules generally encourage withholding
that approximates an individual employee's overall income tax liabil
ity. If the employee wants to withhold more than the minimal
amount, she can do that as well, as many wage-earners do, and then
file for a refund.
Once the employer withholds and subsequently remits the portion
of the income tax liability for which it is responsible, the employee
also has a separate legal responsibility to remit any income tax she
owes in excess of the amount remitted on her behalf by her em
ployer.127 That is, if the employer(s) withholds less than the full
amount of income tax that the employee owes, the employee must
then file a tax return by the filing deadline with a check for the differ
ence. This is obviously what many individual taxpayers do every year
when they send a check in with their 1040s. Of course, if an employer
withholds and remits more in tax than is owed with respect to the
IRC § 3402(a).
IRC §§ 3101, 3301. In common parlance Social Security, Medicare, and unemploy
ment taxes are typically described as being split equally between the employer and the
employee-with the employer owing half of the tax and the employee owing the other half.
An employer is required to remit both amounts, with the employee's portion being consid
ered an amount deducted and withheld from the employee's wage. As long as the remit
tance burden for both amounts is placed on the employer, the two portions of these taxes
have identical efficiency and distributional effects.
121 IRC §§ 1, 31 (a)(l), 61, 62 (providing that an individual credits taxes withheld against
their tax liability).
125
126
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employee's income, the government refunds the excess to the em
ployee. Thus both the employer and employee have a remittance re
sponsibility with respect to the income tax triggered by an individual
employee's income.12s
Note that under current U.S. tax law, if the employer fails to with
hold and remit the amount required by law from the employee's
wages, the government can seek payment for that amount not only
from the employer but also from the employee. Thus, as to the em
ployer's remittance obligation, if the employer fails to withhold and
pays the employee the pretax wage, the employer is the primary obli
gor and the employee is the secondary obligor. Thus, if the employer
does not deduct and withhold the amount from the employee's pretax
wages, that amount is not credited to the employee for purposes of
her year-end remittance obligation.129 In such a situation, however, if
the Service ultimately recovers the tax from the employer for the un
withheld taxes, the employer may then seek recovery of that amount
from the employee.130 The basis for the employer's claim against the
employee would be contractual rather than statutory. That is, the em
ployer implicitly agrees to pay the employee the post-withholding
amount; therefore, if the employer fails to deduct and withhold, it has
in effect overpaid the employee by the unwithheld amount and can,
contractually, seek recovery for that amount--though perhaps unen
forceable if the employee proves to be judgment-proof. This rule is
akin to joint-and-several liability, in that the government can go after
either the employer or the employee, with a right of contribution
available to the employer if the government ends up collecting from it
the unwithheld tax.131
12s Whenever there are dual remittance obligations of this sort, as compared with a sys
tem in which only one party has a remittance obligation, then there are obviously two
sources (rather than one source) of remittance compliance costs. For example, if we simply
eliminated the remittance role for employee/individual taxpayers and made no other
changes (a system known as final withholding), this would presumably reduce compliance
costs compared with the dual remittance regime. And such a system might be optimal if
society decided not to allow adjustments for the individual circumstances of employees (via
various deductions and credits). Indeed, for some low-income taxpayers who have no
itemized deduction and who work for only one employer, such a system would have much
to recommend it, because of the savings in both compliance and administrative costs. If,
however, society does want to allow individualized adjustments, a regime of dual remit
tance makes more sense.
129 Church v. Commissioner, 810 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1987); Edwards v. Commissioner, 39
T.C. 78, 83 (1962), aff'd, 323 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1963); Goins v. Commissioner, 75 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1243 (1998).
130 Bittker & Lokken, note 107, <JI 1 1 1.5.
131 It is not exactly like joint-and-several liability in practice. It is more like primary and
secondary liability, as the government always goes after the employer first for the amounts
that were supposed to be withheld, and then would go after the employee only if that were
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Placing the initial remittance obligation on the employer makes
sense from an efficiency perspective, both because the employer will
generally be the lower-compliance-cost remitter of the tax (owing to
the economies of scale of compliance discussed above) and because
the employer will be the lower-enforcement-cost remitter (owing to
the economies of scale of enforcement discussed above). Likewise, it
makes sense to allow for recovery from the employee in those cases
where the employee is most likely to have money with which to pay
the tax (namely, where the tax has not in fact been withheld from the
employee's wages).
Our framework would also help to explain the numerous tax with
holding rules other than those for wage withholding. For example,
under the Code, there is withholding on tips (which are obviously akin
to wages)132 as well as on gambling winnings.133 In both cases, it is
easy to imagine a problem of either judgment-proof taxpayers or tax
payers who are relatively costly for the tax enforcement authorities to
pursue. Likewise, the rules requiring tax withholding by U.S. taxpay
ers on payments to foreign individuals or foreign firms can be seen not
so much as a response to the problem of insufficiently capitalized tax
payers, but to the problem of missing (or beyond the reach of our
government) taxpayers.134 Indeed, other countries make even greater
use of withholding regimes than does the United States, often requir
ing payers to withhold and remit taxes on domestic interest and divi
dend payments as well as on payments to independent contractors of
various sorts.135
Even some U.S. states require tax withholding in situations in which
the U.S. federal tax law does not. For example, both Minnesota and
Massachusetts require withholding for payments to certain types of
independent contractors, which under U.S. federal tax law would not
be subject to withholding. In Minnesota it is payments to certain con
struction-industry contractors,136 and in Massachusetts it is payments
unsuccessful. In contrast, with joint-and-several liability, the plaintiff can literally choose
whichever joint tortfeasor it wants to go after.
132 Tips present even bigger noncompliance problems than with wages generally. In
deed, tips are such a problem that the Code now requires large restaurants not only to
withhold for tips, but also to report to the Service for each member of their wait staff an
allocated amount of the restaurant's overall revenue. See generally Yoram Margalioth,
The Case Against Tipping, 9 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 117 (2006) (arguing in favor of
moving towards service charges and away from tipping for a number of reasons, including
concerns about tax evasion).
m See generally IRS, Publication No. 505, Tax Withholding and Estimated Tax (2010).
134 See generally IRS, Publication No. 515, Withholding of Tax on Nonresident Aliens
and Foreign Entities (2009).
135 Germany is one example. See Juhani Kesti, European Tax Handbook 245 (2006).
136 Minnesota now requires taxpayers to withhold and remit taxes on amounts paid to
certain contractors in the construction trade if the total payments for the year are expected
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to certain visiting performers and lecturers.137 In both cases, it is clear
that the concern is with the administrative cost of enforcing tax com
pliance with these groups of payees. Our framework suggests that,
because of the incidence analysis discussed above, imposing the remit
tance obligation in all of these cases on the larger party (who is easier
or cheaper to target with enforcement efforts) comes closest to effi
ciently achieving the policymaker's desired level of revenue subject to
distributional considerations.
A similar story can be used to explain why governments that use
retail sales taxes invariably assign the primary remittance obligation to
the retail sellers rather than retail purchasers. There are obvious
economies of scale to enforcing sales tax remittances against large re
tail sellers rather than against hundreds or thousands of individual
purchasers. It would be the height of folly to insist on auditing every
individual who makes a retail purchase at a Wal-Mart store in a given
year rather than simply to audit the store itself. This is because, to
apply our framework, Wal-Mart is obviously a lower-cost tax remitter
than its customers would be. To illustrate the futility of imposing the
retail sales tax remittance obligation on retail purchasers, consider the
much-maligned use tax. When a consumer purchases goods by mail
order, Internet, or otherwise from outside the state, the state govern
ment will often impose a so-called use tax (charged at the same rate as
the retail sales tax) to be remitted by the purchaser if the seller does
not remit the tax on the purchaser's behalf. Unsurprisingly, the com
pliance rate for such use taxes is generally thought to be close to
zero.138 Indeed, this is one of the reasons why more states are increas
ingly seeking to impose a sales-tax remittance obligation on online
out-of-state retail sellers such as Amazon and iTunes, despite the po
tential constitutional objections.139
to exceed a certain threshold. Minn. Stat. § 290.92, Subdiv. 31 (2009). For a description of
this new rule (effective beginning January 1, 2009), see Minnesota Income Tax Withholding
on Payments to Independent Contractors in the Construction Trades, http://www.taxes.
state.mn.us/taxes/withholding/tax_information/factsheets/wfs18_08.pdf (last visited June
25, 2010)
137 Massachusetts requires withholding and remittance for taxes on payments to per
formers, visiting lecturers, and the like. See generally Mass. Dept. of Revenue, A Guide to
Withholding Taxes on Performers and Performing Entities, http://www.mass.gov/Ador/
docs/dor/Publ/PDFS/performers.pdf (last visited June 25, 2010).
138 See, e.g., Trymaine Lee, State Steps Up Efforts to Collect a Sales Tax Owed by More
in a Digital Age, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 2008, at BO (Noting that "[o]nly 5 percent of the
approximately 9.6 million residents who filed [New York] state income tax returns for 2006
listed anything owed" on the line for the use tax on their returns.)
139 Sewell Chan, The "Amazon Tax" and the "iTunes Tax" Compared, N.Y. Times: City
Room, Dec. 18, 2008, http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/18/the-amazon-tax-and
the-i tunes-tax-compared.
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Another example of current tax remittance law that seems roughly
consistent with the framework of this Article is in the area of gift
transfers. Gifts, whether inter vivos transfers or bequests, are not gen
erally thought of as market transfers. Indeed, to be treated as a gift
for tax purposes the transfers cannot be accompanied by the same sort
of quid pro quo normally associated with market exchange. There
fore, it could be argued that TRIPs would have no application to the
gift context. On the other hand, it is not unusual to think of gifts as
involving some element of reciprocity, and economists have usefully
modeled gifts and bequests as a type of exchange, with the donor ex
pecting something in return from the donee, albeit not necessarily as a
result of any explicit contract. In any event, it would not stretch the
underlying idea of TRIPs beyond recognition to apply it to the gift/
bequest context and thus to argue that, under traditional (extreme)
Coasean and TRIPs assumptions, the assignment of the gift/bequest
tax remittance obligation should not make a difference. Either way,
the donor will adjust the amount of the gift to achieve a given desired
amount of after-tax transfer to the donee. Likewise, an application of
this Article's framework would suggest that, insofar as there are dif
ferential compliance and administrative costs, the assignment of gift/
estate tax remittance responsibility may matter. The choice of the op
timal assignment of that responsibility would depend on the answer to
the question we have repeatedly posed: What assignment of tax re
mittance liability achieves the desired revenue raising and distribu
tional goals at the lowest combined administrative and compliance
costs?
Under current U.S. tax law, the initial or primary tax remittance
obligation rests with the giver or the estate.140 The amount of the tax
is determined by the amount of the donor's tax base (total gift trans
fers less various deductions less a lifetime unified credit) times the
applicable rate structure, 141 which is fairly progressive. Once the do
nor has given more than the excluded amount, the unified gift/estate
tax kicks in, and the donor must remit the tax.142 Of course, we could
imagine a system where the amount of tax was calculated in exactly
the same way, but the remittance obligation would be assigned to the
donee. Indeed, under current law, the donee is secondarily liable for
the gift/estate tax, for which the donor is primarily liable.143 This is
not joint and several liability, but rather primary and secondary liabil
ity.144 That is, if the donor does not pay the liability, the donee must
140
1 41
142
143
144

IRC §§
IRC §§
IRC §§
IRC §§
See id.

2002, 2502(c).
2502(a), (b), 2505.
2502, 2505.
6901(a)(l )(A), 6324(b).
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pay it.145 This primary/secondary assignment of tax liability is entirely
a question of remittance obligation. Either way, the amount is a func
tion of the base of total gifts and bequests that exceed the exemption.
(Thus, as we have already emphasized, the calculation of the amount
of the tax can be divorced from the question of remittance obligation.)
By contrast, if the amount of the tax were calculated by reference to
the donee's tax base (say, by including the gift/bequest in the donee's
gross income), we could likewise imagine various alternative assign
ments of the remittance responsibility: primary liability for the donee
with secondary liability for the donor, the reverse, joint and several
liability, several liability; and so on. Whatever the remittance assign
ment, however, the amount of the tax would be the same-and, pre
sumably, whatever the remittance responsibility, we would call this an
inheritance tax rather than an estate tax.
The framework of this Article suggests that, whatever base is cho
sen, the remittance obligation ought to be designed to, ceteris paribus,
minimize compliance and administrative costs. Given the choice of
the tax base under current law, the current assignment of remittance
responsibility seems reasonably sensible. The idea presumably is that
donors, or their fiduciaries, generally are the lowest-compliance-cost
remitters, which would indeed be so in many cases. Think of a large
estate that pays out sums to many different beneficiaries; in such a
case, compliance and administrative costs presumably could be mini
mized by assigning initial primary remittance liability on the donor.
The remittance by the estate in that case can even be thought of as a
sort of withholding regime.
Also consistent with our least-cost-remitter rationale is the fact that
the remittance responsibility under U.S. income tax law, as well as
under ever other tax regime we are aware of (including various forms
of consumption tax), is largely nontransferable. That is, tax laws gen
erally do not allow Coeasean bargaining with respect to who has the
tax remittance obligation. Put differently, the parties to the transac
tions that trigger taxation are not generally allowed to elect which of
them will be responsible for remitting the tax. There are some excep
tions to this rule. As mentioned above, individual employees can sub
mit W-4 forms requesting the employer not to withhold any tax from
their checks, but this will be largely ineffective. The Service will scru
tinize such requests closely and will not permit such an allocation of
remittance responsibility solely to the individual employee if it ap
pears to be abusive.
Why not? The reason derives from just the sort of enforcement
cost reasons that we have discussed, which are analogous to the con145

IRC § 6324(b).
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cerns about strategic judgment-proofing from the tort context. That
is, if buyers and sellers were allowed to engage in Coasean bargaining
over the allocation of the tax remittance responsibility, there would be
an incentive for them to allocate that responsibility not necessarily to
the one with the lowest compliance costs (which would be socially op
timal) but to the one with the best chance of evading the tax-and
thus the party for whom the government's cost of enforcing a given
tax liability is highest. Using the modified Calebreisan language, they
would not necessarily choose the least-cost harm avoider, but would
also consider who is the least-cost liability avoider, which is the high
est-enforcement-cost remitter. This sort of bargain would be joint
wealth maximizing for the parties involved, but may not be socially
optimal. Hence, it is no surprise that tax remittance obligations are
not generally made transferable. (Indeed, if they were transferable,
one can imagine that retail sellers would seek quickly to shift the re
mittance responsibility for the sales tax from themselves to their cus
tomers, many of whom would have an incentive happily to accept that
responsibility, just as they do for the-effectively unenforceable-re
mittance obligation for the use tax.)
B.

Potential Reform: Expanding the Remittance Role of
(Large) Employers/Payers Withholding for
Independent Contractors

As discussed in the previous Section, U.S. tax law imposes on em
ployers not only the obligation to submit information returns to the
Service regarding the wages they pay their employees (that is, Form
W-2s, which include information about the amount paid and the iden
tity of the payee) but also the obligation to withhold and remit taxes
on those wages. By contrast, with respect to payments made to inde
pendent contractors, although there is a reporting obligation (Form
1099, requiring information similar to a W-2) , the remittance obliga
tion rests with the payee rather than the payer.146 Why the different
treatment for independent contractors? Under the framework of this
Article, the assignment of remittance responsibility to independent
contractors rather than employers has some initial plausibility if we
consider only compliance costs. In many situations, as between em
ployers and their independent contractors, the latter would incur
lower overall compliance costs. This is because, unlike employees
(who tend to work for relatively few employers, usually a single em
ployer), some independent contractors often work for multiple em
ployers. Thus, rather than require multiple employers to gather the
146 See IRC § 1401.
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same information on the same contractor (that is, all of the informa
tion provided on the Form W-4 that enables the withholding amount
to be tailored to the circumstances of the individual), it minimizes
compliance costs in those cases to let the contractor sort out its own
tax remittance obligations.
This does not mean, of course, that the employer/payer is given no
tax compliance-enforcement role with respect to independent contrac
tors. The filing of information returns with the Service lowers the cost
of enforcing the tax laws against the contractors, by giving the Service
a means of cross-referencing returns to ensure proper remittance.
Thus, in theory, the line between employees and independent contrac
tors could be appropriate in that it allows the remittance obligation to
be assigned to the least-cost remitter while imposing a reporting obli
gation on payers as a means of keeping the tax remitters honest.
But that is not the end of the story. First, contractors will some
times have a higher compliance cost than will employers. This could
be the case, for example, when the contractors work for only one em
ployer (or only a few employers) and happen to be classified as an
independent contractor merely because of the definition of that status.
Also, if the employer is significantly larger than the contractor, there
would be economies of scale of the sort described above to placing
remittance responsibility on the employer. In addition, for the rea
sons already discussed, the administrative costs of enforcing remit
tance compliance against independent contractors, especially small
ones (most especially self-employed individuals), turns out to be very
high; and this may be true even with information reporting from the
payers.
With small independent contractors, especially those who are self
employed individuals who work for larger companies but happen to
have independent contractor status, there is a significant possibility of
judgment-proofness. In such cases, even the filing of an accurate
Form 1099 by the employer will not ensure compliance. That is, inso
far as the worker is judgment-proof, an increase in information report
ing does not reduce administrative costs. For those individuals, then,
the fact that their payments are not called "wages" does not diminish
the concern that led to the adoption of a pay-as-you-earn wage with
holding in the first place. For these reasons, assigning the remittance
obligation to contractors rather than to employers has the potential to
result in substantial tax evasion (with all of the efficiency and distribu
tional consequences that such evasion implies) or, if the government
decides to crack down, very substantial enforcement costs.
This is not a hypothetical problem. By far the largest source of tax
noncompliance in the United States lies with self-employed taxpayers.
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Evidence from the IRS National Research Program for tax year 2001
shows a huge variation in the rate of misreporting as a percentage of
actual income by type of income or income offsets (such as deduc
tions).147 For example, only 1 % of wages and salaries, and only 4% of
taxable interest and dividends, go unreported.148 Of course, wages,
salaries, interest, and dividends must all be reported to the Service by
those who pay them; in addition, wages and salaries are subject to
employer withholding. Self-employment business income, by con
trast, is subject to relatively little information reporting, and the esti
mated noncompliance rate for that sort of income is sharply higher.149
An estimated 57% of nonfarm proprietor income (which includes in
dependent contractors) is not reported, which by itself accounts for
more than a third of the total estimated underreporting for the indi
vidual income tax.1 50 Over half of the individual income tax underre
porting gap is attributable to the underreporting of business income,
of which nonfarm proprietor self-employed income is the largest
component.151
Of course, some significant fraction of this self-employed tax gap is
attributable to individuals (or small-scale businesses involving several
individuals) who sell goods or services directly to retail consumers.
For noncompliance in those settings, there are serious limitations on
what the law can do by way of either altering the remittance obliga
tions or introducing new reporting requirements. The compliance and
administrative costs of requiring individual consumers either to with
hold and remit or even to file information returns on consumption
expenditures for federal income tax purposes would obviously be pro
hibitive. (Again, this is why retail sellers rather than purchasers are
generally required to remit state retail sales taxes.) However, in those
cases in which self-employed individuals (or even small businesses
that involve more than one individual) work for a single-or for rela
tively few-business employers and they happen to be characterized
as independent contractors under the common law definition used by
147 See IRS, Nat'l Research Program, Tax Year 2001 Federal Tax Gap, http://www.irs.
gov/pub/irs-news/tax_gap_figures.pdf (last visited June 25, 2010).
148 Id.
149 See id.
1 50 See id.
151 See id. What these data do not reveal is what fraction of the nonfarm proprietor
income derives from self-employed individuals, for whom the judgment-proof and pay-as
you-earn arguments are strongest, and what fraction derives from relatively large (non
judgment-proof) independent contractor businesses. For the latter category of taxpayers, it
could be argued that, rather than impose a new remittance obligation on employers, the
more efficient overall response to noncompliance would be to increase information report
ing on the part of employer-payers, perhaps by increasing penalties for nonfiling of 1099s.
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the tax law, there may be some potential efficiency and distributive
advantages to a change in remittance law.
Specifically, a good case can be made for expanding the withholding
and remittance obligation to include payments by (relatively large)
businesses to (relatively small) independent contractors.152 The obvi
ous benefit of such a rule would be essentially the same as wage with
holding and remittance: to improve compliance or, alternatively, to
reduce the administrative cost of achieving a given level of compli
ance. That is, the pay-as-you-earn concerns that motivated the adop
tion of wage withholding in the first place apply just as much to
payments to individual or small-scale business contractors as they do
to wage earners.153
Such proposals have been made before. For example, the General
Accounting Office in 1992 issued a report calling for, among other
things, a new system of nonwage contractor withholding.154 Most re
cently, the Office of the National Taxpayer Advocate, which identified
the underreporting of self-employment income as one of its primary
areas of concern (listing only the AMT as a larger tax-related problem
for U.S. taxpayers), recommended contractor withholding, with spe
cific withholding percentages to be set, by Congress or Treasury, for
different categories of contractor-payees.155 Such a change obviously
1 52 Note the similarity of this to the practice in some countries of requiring tax to be
remitted by certain parties in conjunction with certain purchases from small businesses, on
the grounds that these payments presumably reflect or indicate taxable income of the re
cipient. Piroska Soos, Self-Employed Evasion and Tax Withholding: A Comparative
Study and Analysis of the Issues, 24 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 107, 130 (1990). In a few cases,
there is reverse withholding, under which tax must be remitted in conjunction with certain
sales to small business taxpayers. Id. at 143-44. Here the link to income is less direct,
although arguably there is an indirect relation, if the transaction is expected to result in
taxable profits, as when importers, wholesalers, or retailers, purchase goods for resale.
Similarly, as mentioned in the text above, some countries require withholding and remit
tance by payers on payments to independent contractors. See Kesti, note 135, at 245.
These withholding remittances can in principle be credited against the income tax liability
of the small businesses, but the presumption is that these businesses often are not in the tax
net, that is, are not filing tax returns and remitting any tax liability. Countries that require
withholding on payments to certain businesses usually exclude as withholding agents indi
viduals in their capacity as consumers and small businesses because they are too numerous
and otherwise not suitable as withholding agents.
153 Under current law, payments to corporations are not subject to withholding, but ob
viously that rule would have to be changed, lest taxpayer-payees get around the require
ment simply by incorporating.
154 GAO, Tax Administration: Approaches for Improving Independent Contractor
Compliance (July 23, 1992), available at http://www.legistorm.com/ls_score/gao/pdf/1992/7/
ful22061.pdf.
155 The report suggests starting with a withholding rate of 3.5% on payments to indepen
dent contractors who generally maintain "inventories or receive payments for materials
and supplies" and 5% for contractors who do not, but then allowing Treasury to determine
appropriate contractor withholding rates for different categories of contractors based on
the average costs of doing business in those areas. Nat'l Taxpayer Advocate: 2003 Annual
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would have some disadvantages, as the compliance costs might be too
large for relatively small business payers, which is why there should be
an exception for businesses below a given size. Of course, contractor
compliance could be improved and enforced costs reduced also by
strengthening the rules regarding information reporting, such as by
increasing the penalties for failure to report. However, to the extent
that many self-employed individuals will be either judgment-proof or
otherwise relativly expensive to prosecute, some version of contractor
nonwage withholding may make sense.
One important implication of our analysis is that, if a contractor
withholding regime were adopted, it should not be made elective, just
as the assignment of tort liability among various joint tortfeasors
should not be elective. That is, contractor withholding is another one
of those areas where Coasean bargaining would tend to exploit exter
nalities rather than internalize them, as the parties would have an in
centive to assign the remittance obligation to the least-cost liability
avoider rather than to the lowest-compliance-cost remitter. Indeed,
under current law, it would be possible for businesses and their con
tractors to enter into voluntary withholding arrangements whereby
the businesses agreed to withhold and remit on their contractor pay
ments.156 But it should come as no shock that such agreements have
not become the norm for contractor payments.
An alternative to introducing contractor withholding would be for
Treasury to be empowered to define and police the doctrinal bounda
ries between employees and independent contractors. As the law
presently stands, the distinction depends on the common law defini
tion derived from agency law, which, though possibly useful in the tort
context, proves to be unhelpful in the tax context. A better way to
draw the line would be to impose the remittance obligation on the
party who is likely to produce the lowest combination of compliance
and administrative costs. For the reasons already discussed, that will
usually be the employer in cases in which the employer is a large cor
poration and the worker is an individual (or even a small firm).
Drawing the optimal line between employer remittance and indepen
dent contractor remittance would require careful study of the relative
compliance and administrative costs. This is just the sort of job that
would normally be assigned to Treasury, which could be tasked with
designing regulations that would make structure optimal remittance
obligations. Unfortunately, as a result of § 530 of the Revenue Act of
Report to Congress 257 ( Dec. 31, 2003 ) , available at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/
nta_2003_annual_update_mcw_l-15-042.pdf. Similar proposals have been floated before.
See, e.g., GAO, note 154.
156 See IRC § 3402(p) (authorizing such agreements) .
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1978,157 Treasury is prohibited from publishing regulations and reve
nue rulings with respect to the employment status of any individual
for purposes of the employment taxes.158 One concrete recommenda
tion that flows from our analysis is that this prohibition should be
lifted and Treasury should be allowed to draw a line between em
ployer remittance and worker remittance that makes tax policy
sense-that minimizes overall compliance and administrative costs.
C.

The Limits of Vicarious Employer Tax Liability:
Scope of Employment

In the preceding analysis, we borrowed ideas from the literature on
vicarious tort liability to suggest ways in which an analogous efficiency
argument can be used to justify what amounts to vicarious employer
tax liability for the taxes owed by employees. That is, because of the
asymmetric cost of enforcing tax remittance obligations imposed on
workers (at least when the workers are individuals-whether employ
ees or independent contractors-or small companies and the employ
ers are relatively large companies), an efficiency story can be told for
placing the remittance obligation on the employer rather than on the
worker. (As we emphasized, this fact is inconsistent with the tax re
mittance invariance propositions that are conventional wisdom among
economists.) Here we discuss whether this idea of vicarious employer
tax liability should be limited by a tax version of the scope-of-employ
ment doctrine.
Recall the nature of the scope-of-employment doctrine in tort law:
It says that employers can be held vicariously and strictly liable for the
torts of their employees only insofar as those workers commit torts
within the scope of their work for the employer.159 The efficiency jus
tification for the rule is that the employer is not the best insurer of the
employee's non-job-related liabilities; and imposing those costs on
employers would inefficiently reduce the scale of the employer's en
terprise. The counter-argument is that perhaps the employer might
be, in some cases, the best insurer of such risks and might even be, if
not the cheapest-cost harm avoider, someone who is in a position to
"bribe" the cheapest-cost harm avoider (probably the worker) to do
just that-avoid the harm.
What would the tax analog of vicarious tax liability with a scope-of
employment limitation look like? It might look very much like the
current system for withholding and remittance for Social Security,
157
158

Revenue Act of 1978 § 530, 26 U.S.C. § 3401 (2006).
Rev. Ru!. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296 (providing guidance with respect to § 530 of the
Revenue Act of 1978).
159 See discussion in Section 111.C.
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Medicare, and unemployment insurance taxes. For those taxes, the
employer is required to withhold and remit an amount that is calcu
lated based exclusively on the wage paid by that employer to that em
ployee.160 Thus, in a sense, those tax remittances are presently limited
to the scope of employment, as they is calculated by applying the rele
vant rates exclusively to the wages paid by the employer with the re
mittance responsibility. As a result, if a worker receives wages from
more than one employer, each employer is responsible for remitting
(only) the employment taxes that are attributable to the wage that
they pay that worker.
What would the tax analog of vicarious tax liability without a scope
of-employment limitation look like? Interestingly, it might look
something like the current rule for income tax withholding in the
United States. With income tax withholding, the idea is that, in most
cases, the employer will withhold and remit enough money to cover
the individual taxpayer's entire income tax liability, not merely the
income tax liability generated by the wage paid to that employee by
that employer.161 In general, as a first approximation, the law allows
employers to withhold in income tax the amount that their employees
tell them to withhold, that is, whatever amount is determined by the
employee's Form W-4, which lists the number of exemptions to be
used in calculating the withholding amount. Indeed, an employee can
request that no income tax whatsoever be withheld. If, however, the
withheld amount proves to be too low (and does not at least approxi
mate the employee's overall tax liability), the IRS has the power to
send the employer what is called a "lock-in" letter, which will require
the employer to withhold an amount that more closely approximates
the employee's true tax liability.162 If the employer fails to enforce
the lock-in withholding amount, the IRS will collect the difference
160 A portion of the tax is formally owed by the employer and a portion is owed by the
employee. However, the employer is responsible for remitting both parts of the tax on
behalf of its employees. IRC § 3101, 3301, 3402(a).
161 Taxpayers are encouraged to submit W-4 forms that fine tune the exemptions so that
this result is approximately achieved. For example, on the IRS web page, there is a with
holding calculator that takes the employee-taxpayer through a number of questions de
signed to help him arrive at a withholding amount that approximates not merely the tax
triggered by the wages paid by the employer, but the overall likely tax liability of the
employee-taxpayer from all sources. See IRS, IRS Withholding Calculator, http://www.irs.
gov/individuals/article/O,,id=96196,00.html. (last visited July 11, 2010). For taxpayers who
have employed spouses, the IRS web page suggests that the online calculator will produce
only a approximation of the appropriate tax remittance. See id. Of course, as with the
Form W-4, the answer produced by this calculator is relatively easy to manipulate simply
by inflating the number of dependency exemptions. However, as discussed in the text im
mediately below, the law has ways of policing such abuse.
162 See T.D. 9337, 2007-2 C.B. 455.
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from the employer.163 Indeed, the lock-in withholding amount proba
bly often results in overwithholding and the need for the employee to
file for a refund.
Of course, employees who have both employment income and
nonemployment (or self-employment) income can avoid .the compul
sory lock-in withholding by simply filing estimated tax returns and re
mitting the tax liability triggered by the other income. But they have
to pay the extra tax. What the employer and employee cannot do-at
least not without the possible consequence of the lock-in letter-is to
collude (in one of those nefarious Coasean tax externalizing transac
tions) to shift all of the remittance responsibility to the employee, who
then fails to pay the tax. The combination of information reporting
(on Form W-2) and lock-in letters deter this possibility. The key ob
servation is that, under current withholding regulations with respect to
federal income tax withholding, the general rule is that employers are
expected to remit (that is, are held vicariously liable for) tax owed by
the employee not only on income triggered by the work with the em
ployer but also from income generated outside of the employment
context-unless the tax on other income is paid via separate estimated
tax payments.164 And this regime is considered neither controversial
nor unusual, even though it is a form of expanded-and vicarious
employer tax liability.
D.

In Rem Taxation

To this point we have focused on the tax remittance analog to tort
liability, and for the most part we have concentrated on income taxes,
with some discussion of sales or other consumption taxes. Turning
briefly now to property taxes, we see an example of a very different
sort of remittance regime, but one that has obvious Coasean roots: in
rem taxation-or taxation "against the property." All individual and
sales taxes are, in the first instance, in personam liabilities in the fol
lowing sense: They are initially enforceable against the person who is
the remitter (or, if there are multiple or overlapping remittance obli
gations, enforceable against the remitters ). Of course, even with in
come taxes, if the person with the remittance obligation fails to remit,
the taxing authority can convert that personal liability into a claim
against taxpayer's personal and real property-an in rem liability.165
163 IRS, Withholding Questions and Answers, Question 6, http://www.irs.gov/individu
als/article/0,,id=139412,00.html (last visited July 1, 2010) .
164 See Bittker & Lokken, note 107, <j[ 111.5.
165 In fact, as mentioned in note 107, with U.S. federal income, gift, or estate taxes, the
U.S. government automatically receives a lien against all the assets of a taxpayer if the
taxpayer does not pay the taxes upon demand. IRC § 6321.
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With an in rem tax liability, as with any in rem liability, the obligation
runs with the land. Thus, if the property is transferred and the in rem
tax liability has not been satisfied, that liability follows the property;
and the party to whom the in rem liability is owed, here the govern
ment, has the power to force a foreclosure sale to satisfy the obliga
tion. One difference between an in rem and an in personam liability is
that if an individual who is personally liable goes through a personal
bankruptcy proceeding, her in personam liabilities will be eliminated;
whereas, in rem liabilities, again not being personal liabilities, remain
enforceable.166 Thus, the remedy that is available to the in rem credi
tor, here the government, would be seizure and sale of the property.
How are these in rem tax liabilities enforced? Normally the taxing
authority will have on file the name of one party who is primarily
responsible for remitting the tax, the party to whom the periodic tax
bill is sent. This is usually the owner of the property. If the owner
fails to pay the tax, the tax collector can then initiate steps to foreclose
on the property. Notice may also be sent to other parties with an
interest in the property, who may have the option to pay the delin
quent tax and assume ownership of the property. In any event, as the
foreclosure process goes forward, all parties with a financial interest in
the property become aware of that fact. And through a public auc
tion, the property will eventually end up in the hands of the highest
valued user.167
What does all of this have to do with optimal tax remittance policy?
In fact, in rem tax liability amounts to a sort of modified joint-and
several liability for the tax that is attributable to a given piece of prop
erty. That is, the tax collector (like the tort plaintiff) in effect can
bring its cause of action against any party with an interest in the prop
erty in question, whichever one has the deepest pocket or is otherwise
easiest, or cheapest, to identify. In rem tax liability, of course, is not
exactly like joint-and-several liability, since none of the potential re
mitters (and potential owners of the property) would be held person
ally liable. However, because of their financial interests in the tax166 See 11 U.S.C. § 524 (2006) (discharging only judgments that are determinations of
personal liability).
167 As Joan Youngman explains, two of the consequences that may be intended by term
ing a tax in rem are (1) that assessments may name the property but not rely on the identi
fication of the owner to establish tax liability, so that publication may be deemed to notify
all interested parties of this claim, and (2) there may be a corresponding absence of per
sonal liability, the remedy for nonpayment being limited to seizure and sale of the property
itself. See Joan Youngman, Tax on Land and Buildings, in 1 Tax Law Design and Drafting
264, 278 (Victor Thuronyi ed., 1996). Youngman counsels against in rem taxes that limit the
liability, and favors listing as liable for remittance obligation anyone "owning, claiming,
possessing, or controlling" an interest in the property on the lien date. Id. (citing language
taken from Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 405 (West 1987)).
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encumbered property, they would have an incentive, at least to the
extent of their financial stake, to pay the outstanding tax liability. The
protection in this situation against potentially judgment-proof taxpay
ers, of course, is not their personal deep pockets, but the value of the
property subject to the tax liens. Thus, in rem tax liability provides an
alternative to deep-pocket vicarious tax liability as a response to the
sorts of compliance obstacles we have discussed. What is more, as we
have noted, this sort of in rem liability is in fact already present not
only for local property taxes, but also for federal income taxes, in cir
cumstances in which the taxpayers in question have assets that can be
attached.
VI .

CONCLUSIONS

Two venerable but heretofore parallel scholarly traditions, tax re
mittance invariance propositions and Coasean variance and invariance
assertions in a market context, share much in common. In both set
tings an equilibrating price will determine which side of the market
bears the costs, either of a harm or a tax obligation, and in both set
tings there is the possibility of off-market negotiation that will reach
private-cost reducing agreements.
The two traditions differ in the centrality for the TRIPs of the en
forcement of remittance obligations by the government. In contract
law, for example, the presumption that maximizing joint benefit is ef
ficient presumes that there are no third parties involved, but introduc
ing a third party is not central. In tax the third party (the government,
as an agent for all citizens) is central, and in particular bargains that
reduce joint compliance costs may, by increasing the enforcement
costs of raising revenue, not be socially optimal. To clarify that differ
ence, we introduce the semantic distinction between the least-cost
harm avoider, a modification of a standard term in tort analysis that
corresponds to tax compliance costs, and the least-cost liability
avoider, which is critically important in tax because the private cost
saving due to evasion of tax liability does not correspond to a social
cost saving, and in fact entails additional enforcement costs.
This new framework allows us to make a number of observations
about current tax remittance law and some tentative suggestions
about potential reforms. The assignment of the remittance burden to
employers rather than employees and to retail sellers rather than con
sumers are obvious examples of placing tax liability on the least-over
all-cost tax remitter. Our emphasis on remittance regimes is not
meant to diminish the importance of information reporting. In some
situations, however-where pay-as-you-earn Gudgment-proof) or
"missing taxpayer" concerns are high-information reporting alone
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will not be enough, and just as the judgment-proof problem may jus
tify vicarious liability in tort, a related phenomenon may suggest the
need for a sort of vicarious or joint tax liability in some settings. In
deed, we argue that this idea could be taken further than it has been,
for example, with the introduction of withholding for payments to
contractors-a reform that would directly respond to what is by far
the largest source of tax noncompliance under the U.S. tax laws:
under-reporting of self-employed and small business income.
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